Hacker strikes through student's router

Anthony DiPierro or at inbox.org
Fri Nov 11 13:03:02 UTC 2005


On 11/11/05, loki tiwaz <loki_tiwaz at hotmail.com> wrote:
> i see the problem, the conundrum is to enable identification of server
> originated traffic without creating identity-revealing data.
>
> Perhaps the nym server thing is exactly the solution that is required, blind
> signed keys which do nothing more than certify that the recipient of the
> signature is known to be a server.

Something along those lines could probably work.  A really simple
implementation of giving top priority to servers might lead to a few
bad people running exit nodes ruining things for everyone, but that
can probably be solved.

You'd probably lose a bit of anonymity, but you'd still be able to
hide your IP address from the end servers, which is one of the main
features of Tor anyway.  For other situations you could always go
through the slower low-priority route.



More information about the tor-talk mailing list