evil nodes

[Chris Palmer]

Chris Palmer writes:

> If an adversary alters the ciphertext of an encrypted cell of Tor
> traffic, the cell will fail the integrity check done by each Tor node
> in your circuit, and the cell will have to be resent.

Peter notes that instead of re-sending the cell, Tor will tear-down the
circuit.

Either way, an adversary that is not an exit node cannot get away with
altering your traffic.


-- 
http://www.eff.org/about/staff/#chris_palmer

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