hostile node anonymity attack scenario

[Geoffrey Goodell]

On Mon, Jan 31, 2005 at 09:34:10PM -0800, Paul Forgey wrote:
> That answers my question. So any attack approaching my scenario would 
> thus require that enough of these nodes have fooled whomever we trust to 
> publish the master list of permanent nodes. Or, in simpler terms, not 
> likely!

A more interesting question to ask might be, "what happens if a client
creates N independent connections through the network, over a long
period of time so that circuits are not reused?"  If a malicious
operator possesses only three nodes, and N is sufficiently large (i.e.
greater than n*(n-1)*(n-2), where n is the number of Tor nodes), then
chances are, the attacker would be able to break the anonymity of at
least one connection...

Geoff
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