[tor-relays] Fwd: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes

George Hartley hartley_george at proton.me
Wed Aug 7 12:43:50 UTC 2024


> I also don't like the idea of using exit servers as entrances to Tor.


But you do realize that Tor exits also receive the Guard flag, and Guard probability assigned?

Check my server:

https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/0F8538398C61ECBE83F595E3716F7CE7E4C77B21

It mostly acts as an exit, but also has hidden services and users on it.

Kindly,
George
On Saturday, August 3rd, 2024 at 5:19 PM, Landon <reply at mynetblog.com> wrote:

> Hello,
> 

> I am a bridge relay operator. As a bridge operator, I run my bridge to allow people in countries who experience government censorship to access the real uncensored Internet. I would not be willing to add a service to my server that could compromise my users' anonymity.
> 

> 

> I don't understand the necessity for an echo-server. What would an echo-server do that current Internet servers are currently not doing?
> 

> You mention the ability to PING. Maybe I am not understanding your intentions for this pinging, but if it is to ping a Tor user, I think this would be a very bad idea. This could allow someone (AKA evil government spy) to know when someone is using Tor or the chat service. This might also be used to identify the computer that the Tor user is using by sending sequences of pings to that user; if the adversary is also able to monitor their network traffic, then the pinged Tor user could possibly be identified.
> 

> 

> I kind of think that you are trying to reinvent the wheel here. You want the echo-server to be a chat server on the open Internet that is accessed through the Tor network?
> 

> We already have a tried and trusted chat server network on the open Internet called Internet Relay Chat (IRC) that has been used for decades as a public chat service. IRC is very anonymous when accessed through Tor.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IRC
> 

> There are IRC servers that I have used that do accept incoming chat connections from the Tor network and they do anonymize the incoming connection which hides the fact that you are accessing the server via Tor. There are even IRC servers that operate as a hidden Tor service.
> 

> I use KVirc IRC client software:
> https://www.kvirc.net/
> 

> For example connecting to OFTC IRC server with KVirc client:
> 

> 

> Attempting secure connection to irc.oftc.net (OFTC) on port 6697
> Attempting to 'bounce' on proxy pi on port 9050 (protocol SOCKSv5)
> 

> This routes all IRC traffic through the Tor network and the IRC server is configured to accept connections from the Tor network.
> 

> For chat servers that cache messages, there are servers such as matrix.org that can be accessed via Tor.
> 

> Pretty much any chat server software can be configured as a hidden Tor service. So, I don't understand what your new chat software would do that doesn't already exist.
> 

> I also don't like the idea of using exit servers as entrances to Tor. Exit servers are more rare as compared to other Tor servers except maybe bridges. It is easy to operate an entry node or middle relay node. Exit nodes involve more risk to the node operator.
> 

> Landon
> 

> 

> On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 7:30 AM Sam <alleestrasse100 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 

> > Hello,as tb discussed further with developers of Tor, the concept of "Reflec-Tor"s (and Exit-Nodes to be seen also as an Entry-Node) might have an impact like Snowflakes for Chat and Messaging over Tor and addresses opinions of Relay admins and university research too.
> > Regards
> > 

> > 

> > ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> > Date: Di., 16. Juli 2024 um 20:36 Uhr
> > Subject: Fwd: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes
> > To: <tor-dev at lists.torproject.org>
> > 

> > 

> > System wrote via Tor Project <noreply at forum.torproject.org>:
> > ============================================================
> > 

> > Feedback: Please submit the proposal also to tor-dev: tor-dev Info Page
> > =======================================================================
> > 

> > Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes
> > 

> > =============================================================================================================================================
> > 

> > https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/1e4te8m/introducing_discussing_reflectors_as_concept/
> > 

> > ============================================================================================
> > 

> > 

> > 

> > ========================
> > 

> > ==============================================================
> > ==============================================================
> > 

> > Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes
> > ============================================================================================================================================
> > 

> > 

> > 

> > Tor-Messaging: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay |
> > 

> > Hello,
> > 

> > I think this belongs to this core, general, relay topic-forum, as it is also a development & community issue, request and efford, I post it here into the reddit forum for your core discussion:
> > 

> > The idea is to add next to Bridges, Relays and Exit-Nodes also "Entry-Nodes" as "Reflec-Tor"(s) to the point of Exit-Nodes. Hence: Exit-Nodes are developed futher to be also an Entry-Node.
> > 

> > Some may remember when gnutella got hybrid with edonkey and then also with torrent, Mike Stokes from Shareaza did that.
> > 

> > The idea today, 20 years later, is to add some Echo-capabilities to Tor in regard of the servers for Exit and Entry.
> > 

> > Vision: Every (updated) Exit-Node is an Echo-Server - For a better Tor-Messaging.
> > 

> > What does that mean?
> > 

> > An Echo-Server is a server for chat-messaging to send an incomming message packet again out to all connected clients at the moment. Ping-in and Ping-Out to all. That simple, that's why it is called the Echo. Like a shout in front of a forrest, all connected users can hear and get the (encrypted) shout or message or packet back from the tree wall.
> > 

> > There are 3 software applications for Echo-Servers:
> > 

> > -   https://github.com/textbrowser/spot-on (Desktop, sercer in the Listener Tab)
> >     

> > -   https://github.com/textbrowser/smokestack (java for Android)
> >     

> > -   https://github.com/textbrowser/spot-on-lite (headless deamon for Linux)
> >     

> > 

> > Now, the Listener function with ping in and ping out should be implemented within a Tor-Exit-Node.
> > 

> > When it comes to Tor-Messaging, there are some pathes possible:
> > 

> > `A) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Tor - Internet - Echo-Server - Internet - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (Tor-proxied Chat-Server, which only accepts encrypted packets)`
> > 

> > `B) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Echo - Tor - Tor - Echo - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (Echo Tor-tunneled)`
> > 

> > `C) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Echo-Server - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (direct connection to Echo-Server with only encypted packets)`
> > 

> > The request here is to build and develop option A.
> > 

> > That is just right now also possible, by an Exit-Node of Tor running the Echo-Server-Software on the same machine in parallel. Just the port is different.
> > 

> > This is an idea for some might be new, but thinking Tor Messaging a bit, it comes quickly to this ideas and better soluttion.
> > 

> > The way to connect
> > 

> > `D) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Hidden Onion Server v3 - Tor - Tor - Hidden Onion Server v3 - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob`
> > 

> > is the current given way for clientes like RicoChet Refresh, Quiet or Cwtch.
> > 

> > Similar to Briar, even developers of such clients above tell the loss of messages and low reliability of the hidden to hidden path. Some of you might know, that there were use cases with missing messages in a range of 35-45 %. Don't quote me on that, but as core developers and community members you might be in contact with those who experience this.
> > 

> > Furthermore the Messaging clients are not advanced in functionality, nor advanced in strong encryption.
> > 

> > It would be third a long development way to got that route.
> > 

> > It is cost effective and needs cappable developers.
> > 

> > Some project have stamped on and made a workable client, but does that unite all our power in the sense of Tor-Messaging?
> > 

> > Messaging needs a Vision and Statement from the Tor-Core-Developer team with a discussion in the community in that regard with honor to the individual projects and also with support for their chosen path (Model D). At the same time we have to state that it is as it is, a HTTP-Server in the middle like in Model A is faster than Model D.
> > 

> > In the graph-path the Echo-Server in the middle handles only encrypted traffic, so it is just like another Relay. We can call it "Reflec-Tor". The only sense it to multiply incomming encrypted packets from one node to all connected nodes.
> > 

> > With that Idea, the Messenger Spot-On could be used as a Tor-Messenger.
> > 

> > This Messenger has stong encryption and is full of feature for messaging and also cryptography.
> > 

> > it is like adding Firefox to Tor-Browsing, when Spot-On is added to Tor-Messaging.
> > 

> > Something to read at the community forum:
> > 

> > https://www.reddit.com/r/Spot_On_Encryption/
> > 

> > Also there is a Mobile Client for Android, which also connects to Reflec-Tors, find "Smoke" Messenger at F-Droid.org.
> > 

> > Please, get this right, it is not about a technical view on slow and failing chat-packets to hidden servers, and it is not about those start-up clients using this inside technology, some do a good project. It is about the idea, that an Reflec-Tor mirroring and pinging back packets on the Exit-Node this hop within the path of tor is not outside, it is always fully encryted for the messaging packets and should be seen as one Tor-Path, especially if the Listener-Ping-Back function (the Echo capabilities) is build in the Exit-Node-Tor Software.
> > 

> > Spot-On is already a Tor-Messenger - as it uses also HTTPs and it sends only encrypted packets.
> > 

> > A test is easy to make:
> > 

> > `(1) Start the Tor-Browser, which has always the Port 9051 to Tor, Tor is running.`
> > 

> > `Next to Surfing with Tor-Browser Firefox the Chat with Tor-Messenger Spot-On can start.`
> > 

> > `(2) Start Spot-On on a webserver and create in the Listeners Tab a Listener on Port 4710.`
> > 

> > `(3) Start two Spot-On Instances Alice and Bob on two Laptops, in the Neighbors Tab you connect the Webserver via Tor: Add the IP and Port 4710 to the neighbor and choose Proxy:` 127.0.0.1 `Port 4710.`
> > 

> > You get the the Path:
> > 

> > `Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Tor - Internet - Echo-Server - Internet - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob`
> > 

> > The idea is now to integrate this a bit more:
> > 

> > `Tor-Chat-Client-Spot-On-Alice - Tor - [Tor-Exit-Node also Reflec-Tor (Echo-Server)] - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Spot-On-Bob`
> > 

> > You see, the way stays all within the Tor-Family.
> > 

> > For sure, in case Alice does not want to use Tor, she also can message to Bob, who is behind Tor.
> > 

> > `Tor-Chat-Client-Spot-On-Alice --> [Tor-Exit-Node as Entry-Node also Reflec-Tor (Echo-Server)] - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Spot-On-Bob`
> > 

> > The IP of an Entry-Node is shown in the Tor-Browser and can get a port added. Then two user can simply cata over that node.
> > 

> > We need in times of surveillance, data retention, chat control and for sake of the needs of whistleblowser and people who want to chat privat and anonymously more decentral and open source chat server.
> > 

> > The mission is: Every Tor-Exit Node is an Entry-Node for Chat.
> > 

> > It should be not a lot of code to be added to the ports of an Exit-Node and displaying the Port of the Exit-Node in the Tor-Browser path icon.
> > 

> > This makes sense in several effects to be discussed and developed further:
> > 

> > -   Taking the next Development Step for Tor-Messaging: BTW, A Forum about Tor-Messaging could be made as a category here in the forum please.
> >     

> > -   directly support Tor-based Messaging for the Spot-On Messaging client
> >     

> > 

> > To be developed and discussed is, if this infra-structure could help to
> > 

> > -   support bootstrapping of Tor
> >     

> > -   support Censorship circumvention of Tor Reflec-Tors as SnowFlakes over the Messenger with EPKS
> >     

> > -   Accept, that some routing to an HTTPS internet server at the Tor-Node is faster than to an hidden onion server at the Tor Node.
> >     

> > 

> > Well, to add some "ping-in-and-out" for an packet is what every netcat and socat under linux can do. It is a small development step to make each Tor-Exit node a free chat server for messaging, which is a big step for mankind to have a network of free messaging chat servers.
> > 

> > Lets also see, how users and community will test and develop this messaging. So it is not only a discussion for developers, it is also a step forward the needs of the communities for a free internet:
> > 

> > -   for chat and their discussions.
> >     

> > 

> > A few code lines to exit nodes make them a Reflec-Tor and messaging over Tor can start really decentral and open source and free.
> > 

> > What do you think? does this privacy-concept bring more privacy and reliability in packet delivery to messaging with Tor?
> > 

> > Regards
> > 

> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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