[tor-relays] removing tor versions from "recommended versions" before they reach EOL

Georg Koppen gk at torproject.org
Wed Mar 1 08:37:49 UTC 2023


nusenu:
> Hi,
> 
> the tor 0.4.5.x end of live versions are still on the recommended 
> versions list:
> 
> https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#recommendedversions
>> consensus     client-versions 0.4.5.6, 0.4.5.7, 0.4.5.8, 0.4.5.9, 
>> 0.4.5.10, 0.4.5.11, 0.4.5.12, 0.4.5.14, 0.4.5.15, 0.4.5.16, 0.4.7.7, 
>> 0.4.7.8, 0.4.7.10, 0.4.7.11, 0.4.7.12, 0.4.7.13
>>     server-versions 0.4.5.6, 0.4.5.7, 0.4.5.8, 0.4.5.9, 0.4.5.10, 
>> 0.4.5.11, 0.4.5.12, 0.4.5.14, 0.4.5.15, 0.4.5.16, 0.4.7.7, 0.4.7.8, 
>> 0.4.7.10, 0.4.7.11, 0.4.7.12, 0.4.7.13
> 
> it would probably be better to stop recommending tor versions
> a month before they reach their eol date so relay operators get to see
> a log entry and have some time to react.

I am not sure about that. I think not recommending them anymore once a 
series reached EOL seems reasonable to me (there are arguments for 
stopping the recommendation of *particular* versions of a series earlier 
than that, though[1]), in particular as we usually do not start the 
nagging and rejection of EOL relays, say, earlier than 4 weeks after 
that anyway. That should give operators still plenty of time to upgrade.

That said those older and EOL versions are gone now from the recommended 
version strings.

Georg

[1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/149
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