[tor-relays] Help Turkmens to bypass Internet censorship: run an obfs4 bridge!

[lists at for-privacy.net]

On Dienstag, 1. August 2023 23:22:12 CEST Gary C. New via tor-relays wrote:
> On Tuesday, August 1, 2023, 10:54:40 AM MDT, <lists at for-privacy.net> wrote:
> 
>  On Montag, 31. Juli 2023 23:06:54 CEST Gary C. New via tor-relays wrote:
> >> Please let me know, if you are able to get the OBFS4
> >> bridge working without exposing the ORPort. Respectfully,
> >
> > Yes, that's working
> 
> Great News!
> 
> > == Announcements ==
> > rdsys is ignoring the running flag now :)
> > * To hide your bridge's ORPort:
> > ORPort 127.0.0.1:auto>
> > AssumeReachable 1
> 
> Per Roger's comment in the Issue, it sounds like I can simply firewall
> incoming connections to the ORPort and add the AssumeReachable 1 directive
> to the torrc? Is that correct?
I am currently forwarding OBFS4 port and ORPort on my router. At the moment it 
is more important that I find an IP with Gus that can be reached from 
Turkmenistan. At the weekend I will test with unused bridges whether the 
ORPort is needed or not.

> > The previously mentioned logs and the Tor metrics showing the bridge as
> >offline can be ignored.

> The failure logs and metrics are going to be confusing to new obfsbridge
> operators. I suppose documenting this on the obfsbridge setup page will
> have to be sufficient in the interim; along, with pointing them to the
> bridgedb metrics page.

We should note that this is a new feature which has yet to be tested.

Gus wrote to me:
"But, it's still a new feature and I don't know if it will break something.
Can you check if the number of connections/users drops and if bridgeDB
assign your bridge to a new distribution method? Let me know if
something breaks!"


-- 
╰_╯ Ciao Marco!

Debian GNU/Linux

It's free software and it gives you freedom!
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