[tor-relays] Recent rejection of relays

[Georg Koppen]

Jonas via tor-relays:
> Where is this criteria documented?

I am not sure what criteria you mean but we have our bad-relay 
criteria[1] documented at our wiki and keep fingerprints we reject due 
to attacks we noticed there as well[2].

> It seems the tor project, or its designated volunteers, are increasing controlling and managing the network. In the Swiss Federation and EU this turns the tor project into an "online service provider" or "online platform" and subjects one to all sorts of regulations and compliance regimes.
> 
> We already get enough requests from the police regarding relays hosted in our datacenters. Shall we point them at tor as the network operator?

The Tor Project is not running the network. It's comprised of relays run 
mostly by volunteers. I am actually not really sure either what you are 
proposing to be honest. Shall we just keep the relays attacking our 
users in the network instead?

Georg

[snip]

[1] 
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Criteria-for-rejecting-bad-relays
[2] 
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks

> 
> ---------- Original Message ----------
> On Wed, November 10, 2021 at 8:59 AM,  Georg Koppen<gk at torproject.org> wrote:
> Hello everyone!
> 
> Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on
> our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked
> roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only
> a small fraction of them had the guard flag, so the vast majority were
> middle-only relays. We don't have any evidence that these relays were
> doing any attack, but there are attacks possible which relays could
> perform from the middle position. Therefore, we decided we'd remove
> those relays for our users' safety sake.
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> 

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