[tor-relays] [Censorship in Russia] Make HTTPS/Moat captcha more complex?

[Gary C. New]

Dave,
After corresponding with Neel and reviewing I2P's obfuscating techniques, in more detail, it does appear that I2P is blockchaining the fingerprint-to-host database to all garlic routers. What is not clear is whether said database is encrypted and secured from operators and only accessable by the garlic routers themselves?
My thoughts are... What if the Tor Network distributed encrypted fingerprint-to-host databases to browsers/bridges/relays during the bootstrap process, with Directory Authorities, that operators did not have access? Such a process could be further segmented, so only a fraction of the browser/bridge/relay population would have a portion of the fingerprint-to-host database at any given time.
While you are correct in surmising that such obfuscation techniques still wouldn't prevent organizations, with adequate resources, from eventually discovering browser/bridge/relay addresses, over the wire, it might slow their blacklisting/censorship efforts and provide browsers/bridges/relays with a longer shelf-life.
These thoughts are predicated on the Tor Network satisfying questions of security vs usability and opportunity vs cost.
I hope this sheds some light on my previous comment.
Respectfully,

Gary
"It seems to be an inherent obstacle in design attempting to anonymize a sub-network within an established known super-network." –Gary C. New
 

    On Monday, December 27, 2021, 7:03:34 AM MST, Dave Warren <dw at thedave.ca> wrote:  
 
 On 2021-12-22 23:42, Gary C. New via tor-relays wrote:
> I know it might be a fundamental change to the Tor network, but would it 
> be possible to obfuscate the Tor bridge/relay addresses with their 
> respective fingerprints; similar, to the I2P network? I've often thought 
> that this aspect of the I2P network is one that is implemented well. 
> Perhaps Directory Authorities could preform fingerprint to address 
> resolution? I think it would be extremely beneficial if neither bridge 
> or relay addresses were published in the wild. It would make great 
> strides in further buffering the Tor network from various 
> black-listing/censorship techniques.

I guess I'm not sure how this would work, for me as a user, when I 
launch tor browser? How do I obtain a bridge or an initial relay?

And as a trivially simple example, what stops an organization with 
government level resources from offering $10-$100 (in appropriate 
currency) to any citizen that adds a newly discovered bridge to their list?

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