[tor-relays] Responding to Tor censorship in Russia

[abuse department]

So we want bridges without contact info and from unknown persons / state agencies?

I am sure there is nothing with this excellent plan that could possible go wrong.


> 
> A bridge has no `family´. An entity running bridge and exit generates an end-to-end situation and might not be what we want.
> 
> 
> Cheers, Felix
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