[tor-relays] >23% Tor exit relay capacity found to be malicious - call for support for proposal to limit large scale attacks

[entensaison at use.startmail.com]

Hi,
 
On Sunday, July 5, 2020 at 8:45 PM, Imre Jonk <imre at imrejonk.nl> wrote:
 
> Hi nusenu,
> 
> On Sun, 2020-07-05 at 18:35 +0200, nusenu wrote:
 
> [...]
 
>> b) require a verified physical address for large operators (>=0.5%
>> exit or guard probability)
>> (manual verification, low number of operators).
>> It is not required that the address is public or stored after it got
>> verified.
>> For details see bellow [2].
>> 
>> 0.5% exit probability is currently about 500-600 Mbit/s of 
>> advertised
>> bandwidth.
> That seems reasonable. I currently co-run an exit relay that has just
> under 0.1% probability and would be okay with sharing my physical
> address with the directory authorities, especially if my probability
> would be higher.
This is a great point. Independent of the measures that will be chosen,
they should impact the traffic a relay gets.
Most relay operators want their relays to be useful
and are willing to do put a lot of work into increasing their traffic.
And they should be "rewarded" with flags so that it is obvious
to relay operators that they have an interest in actually
fulfilling the new requirements.
 
> [...]
>  
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