[tor-relays] >23% Tor exit relay capacity found to be malicious - call for support for proposal to limit large scale attacks

[Guinness]

Le Wed, Jul 08, 2020 at 05:22:44PM +0200, Toralf Förster écrivait :
> On 7/8/20 12:35 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> > * One is dividing the network into known and unknown relays, where we
> > reserve some minimum fraction of attention for the known relays. Here
> > the next steps are to figure out how to do load balancing properly with
> > this new parameter (mainly a math problem), and to sort out the logistics
> > for how to label the known relays so directory authorities can assign
> > weights properly (mainly coding / operator ux).
> 
> Which boils down to "subjective" versus "objective" criterias of a weight distribution algorithms.
> 
> Which is fine as long as the maths behind it is public available and understandable.
> 
> This would enable a relay operator to verify/falsify it.
> 

I'm pretty sure the maths behind it will be public. For the
"understandable" part, I guess there can be a double explanation, one
for the mathematicians/CS that know/understand the maths, and a
popularisation of this explanation for those who don't understand the
maths.

Cheers,
-- 
Guinness