[tor-relays] [tor-exit] good node providers

dns1983 at riseup.net dns1983 at riseup.net
Sat Feb 16 04:59:10 UTC 2019


As regards Linux box I would say one thing: if you are worried about NSA etc.. how you could use operating systems that are not enterly free software? If your operating system contains binary blob, if your mother board hasn't a free boot loader how do you know that it has not a backdoor or some vulnerability that compromise your privacy?

On the wiki too I read "we want avoid the Debian monoculture"... Yes, it would be a great thing, but which are the other non linux options that allow to run an entirely free software system? 

And why Tails use non free Linux?

I don't want to flame, but I think there is a little contradiction in this.

Bye


Il 16 febbraio 2019 05:36:33 CET, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> ha scritto:
>Reminder, as many times before...
>
>Anyone can pay cheap $ to pack yet more nodes
>on already saturated providers. This does nothing
>for diversity against NSA, GCHQ, BND, RCMP, AFP,
>FVEY+, etc... who all share fibre taps, and Sybils, all
>who trivially exploit tor. The simple plausibilty of such
>is all documented in whitepapers, and in curious cases
>of parallel construction.
>
>Your odds at frustrating these adversaries are much better if you:
>1) Place nodes where there are no nodes today
>by AS and jurisdictional geography.
>Don't ask who's popular, permissive, and cheap,
>that does nothing, ask who has naught but one other node,
>and finally do research on your own to find who has none.
>2) Develop a PKI person to person in real life verified
>node infrastructure between yourselves that users can
>subscribe to.
>3) Analyze the fuck out of node metadata and
>feed that into subscribable path options.
>4) Don't prop up yet another Linux box.
>
>Seems NO ONE is doing this yet, since years
>worth of being informed of it. That's a shame.
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>tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
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