[tor-relays] Tor-bridge list

Philipp Winter phw at torproject.org
Mon Dec 9 21:53:56 UTC 2019

On Sun, Dec 08, 2019 at 10:13:08PM +0100, lists at for-privacy.net wrote:
> I put a bridge on an unused server. Currently listed on Tor-metrics.
> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/48022B9A9402CB6D9918C03B8AFD2A073110B1BD

Thanks for running a bridge!

> But the IP per mail will soon have the "bad guy's". That would be too bad.
> With 2 Tor-instances, the server has reached 80-100 MiB/s
> Does the Tor-project have any other more secret bridge lists?

There are two ways of distributing your bridge.  You can do it
automatically by having your bridge announce itself to BridgeDB, our
bridge distribution system.  That's the default behaviour.  BridgeDB
then distributes your bridge over email, HTTPS, and moat.
Alternatively, you can distribute your bridge manually by using the
config option "BridgeDistribution none" to tell BridgeDB that it
shouldn't distribute your bridge.  If you do this, it's your
responsibility to find users and give them your bridge lines.

> Is it useful to offer other transport protocols than obfs4?

Not at this point.  We're not aware of any government or commercial
firewall being able to block the obfs4 protocol.

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