[tor-relays] Emerald Onion's new relays

[nusenu]

> We are in the process of creating an RPKI ROA for our prefixes

Thanks for taking the extra steps to create a RPKI ROA to reduce
the impact of BGP routing attacks on your prefixes. Extra points for 
doing RPKI-based Route Origin Validation on your BGP routers.

I hope to convince everyone with such a high concentration of tor network
capacity to make use of tor's OfflineMasterKey mode to safeguard your relay
identity keys even in the event of a system compromise.
Which basically implies automation because no one wants to handle (renew) more than 
3 keys manually.


I'm also encouraging you to use separate IP addresses for exit traffic [1]
because that helps eliminate the impact on relay-to-relay communication
when ISPs are ordered to BGP blackhole some exit IP addresses 
(as we have seen recently in the news).

> 40 new uncapped and unfiltered exit relays

I would suggest to not run uncapped tor instances
but to set a per-instance limit of around 80-90% what a single core 
is able to handle, to avoid poor performance for the user.
With growing bandwidth the CPU will spend considerable amount of resources
just handling packets (kernel).

> This work is part of our efforts to saturate our new unmetered 10Gbps
> transit link 

As teor usually says, saturated links is not what we should be aiming for
if we like performance.


Thanks for adding such a significant amount of exit capacity.



[1] https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#OutboundBindAddressExit

-- 
https://twitter.com/nusenu_
https://mastodon.social/@nusenu

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 833 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20190402/8a23cb32/attachment.sig>