[tor-relays] Policy Question: Tor Exits at Universities, Corporate Networks, etc

Conrad Rockenhaus conrad at rockenhaus.com
Sat Sep 1 23:47:04 UTC 2018


I know this is an issue of semantics here, but when you say “Tor Exit in Turkey censoring access to various access to various websites” you’re kind of putting the onus on them directly instead of the repressive anti-free speech regime that they are operating the the exit under. Why not be more clear and direct with your language and state the “Tor Exit in Turkey that is being actively censored by it’s upstream” or the “Tor Exit that is being actively censored by an unknown third party” instead of putting the blame on them?

Furthermore, even western countries have limits to what you can access from those countries. As others have said - you can’t access torrent sites from the UK, heck, you can’t even access EncyclopediaDramatica (certain pages of it anyway) from Australia. Should we mark those exits as bad because they can’t access certain pages as well?



> On Sep 1, 2018, at 4:56 PM, Nathaniel Suchy <me at lunorian.is> wrote:
> 
> Recently we've been discussing a Tor Exit in Turkey censoring access to various websites.
> 
> It's less to some err, disagreements on what should and should not be allowed. I've seen a few opinions:
> *) It grants an outside view at what Turkey censors
> *) It could push new tor users away
> 
> This leads me to question if it's okay for a Tor Exit to be on a censored network are the following scenarios now allowed?
> *) A Tor Exit behind a Corporate Network and Web Filter
> *) A Tor Exit behind a University Network and Web Filter
> Under the logic with the Turkey exit relay it should be right?
> 
> Cordially,
> Nathaniel
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> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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