[tor-relays] Why adding more Nodes won't help?

[dave` dave]

i saw that is a way to change the numbers of nodes in this site
http://thesprawl.org/research/tor-control-protocol/#creating-really-fast-one-hop-circuits
any one knows how it works, there is not enough information how to use it.



On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 1:59 PM, Peter Ludikovsky <peter at ludikovsky.name>
wrote:

> For that I'd suggest you look into running a separated test network with
> all nodes having
>   TestingTorNetwork 1
> in their torrc. Then you can change the hop number in the source &
> experiment away, without impacting the real network.
>
> Regards,
> /peter
>
>
> On 2018-05-24 10:30, dave` dave wrote:
>
>> I don't have something specific to hide, i just wonder how can i set more
>> or less node for testing- im running all the nodes(Bridge,Guard, middle
>> and
>> exit) and i wanna know if I'm define for example one node the traffic will
>> be encrypt or not?(if i can define a one node only)
>> or adding more nodes.
>>
>> On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 5:47 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Paths are driven by the client and unchecked, it's not hard to do.
>>> However first you're better off taking a serious look at your threat
>>> model, which you've not mentioned at all for anyone to help you
>>> qualify it and any potential solutions therein, before turning random
>>> knobs in whatever anonymous overlays you're using.
>>>
>>> Likely more useful than hop count would be analysis
>>> of the real world node network, with path selection
>>> leanings and choices being made therein.
>>> But again, no one seems to be taking up and
>>> working that project. Sybils all the way down...
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> tor-relays mailing list
>>> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> tor-relays mailing list
>> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>>
>> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20180524/79314f41/attachment.html>