[tor-relays] #2667 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exits should block reentry into the tor network

nusenu nusenu-lists at riseup.net
Wed Jan 31 11:56:00 UTC 2018

Roger Dingledine:
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:41:00AM +0000, nusenu wrote:
>>> Comment (by arma):
>>>  I continue to think that teaching exit relays to avoid allowing exit
>>>  connections to known relays (IP:ORPort) is a good and useful step.
>>>  We keep running across messy situations where letting somebody connect to
>>>  a relay from an exit relay's IP address turns into a security surprise.
>> Does that mean that exits will no longer be able to run tor clients (ie. to 
>> run apt updates via tor)?
> No, they are unrelated. 

Great, thanks for the fast reply.

> (Also, if you want to reply to a trac ticket comment, the strategy of
> responding on the tor-relays list is a very odd approach. :)

If the answer was yes - that would be relevant to this list.

I'm looking forward to the day where you can reply to tickets via email :)

twitter: @nusenu_

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