[tor-relays] Combined relay and hidden service, good idea or not?

Alain Wolf tormaster at urown.net
Tue Jan 9 02:54:10 UTC 2018

On 08.01.2018 23:59, Dave Warren wrote:
> On 2018-01-08 14:09, Tortilla wrote:
>> On Mon, January 8, 2018 11:25 am, Dave Warren wrote:
>>> On 2018-01-08 03:21, Florentin Rochet wrote:
>>>>> Perhaps in the case that the HS operator is not trying to mask the HS
>>>>> location, the act of mixing public relay traffic can be nothing but a
>>>>> *help* to defeat anyone trying to correlate traffic coming to the HS
>>>>> with
>>>>> traffic emanating from any one client.
>>>> Yes, if the HS operator does not want to mask the HS location, then it
>>>> is all good. For that purpose, I agree that the warning message should
>>>> be changed.
>>> Indeed. I run some public resources (e.g. torproject.org mirror) on a
>>> public URL with a .onion site as well. Nothing is intended to be hidden,
>>> I simply want the content of anything I mirror to be available to Tor
>>> users without relying on an exit.

I think the real issue here is once more the wording "hidden service"
for something which is, in your case, not intended to be hidden.

I believe thats why the term "Onion Service" was introduced.

A foolproof solution would be, that a relay complains and refuses to
start if a "hidden onion service" is configured on the same instance.
But would run without warning with "public onion services".

I have no idea if a distinction between "public" and "hidden" onion
services is planned or if its just change of wording until now.

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