[tor-relays] Combined relay and hidden service, good idea or not?

Igor Mitrofanov igor.n.mitrofanov at gmail.com
Fri Jan 5 03:17:04 UTC 2018

It is safe to assume that both relays and select hidden services are
being scanned 24/7. When your host reboots (say, as a result of an
automatic OS update), both your relay and your hidden service become
unavailable at the same time, instantly revealing the IP of the hidden

On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 7:08 PM,  <tortilla at mantablue.com> wrote:
> When operating a hidden service and a relay in one tor instance, tor
> currently warns:
> [warn] Tor is currently configured as a relay and a hidden service. That's
> not very secure: you should probably run your hidden service in a separate
> Tor process, at least -- see https://trac.torproject.org/8742
> First, that issue has been fixed and closed.
> Second, I had read in the past opinions stating:
> When operating a hidden service, running a relay helps mix traffic so that
> anyone observing traffic from the machine cannot easily run an analysis
> targeted at a hidden service that might exist on that machine.
> The text of the startup warning seems to contradict that belief.  Is there
> more to know, or is the warning only applicable to the now-closed
> information leak?
> Can someone kindly clarify the current best practice in this regard and
> address whether or not that warning should be removed from tor's startup
> diagnostics?
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