[tor-relays] Options for Managing Relay Load (was: Re: Really strange)

[r1610091651]

Thx for the wisdom ;-)

On Thu, 4 Jan 2018 at 00:09 teor <teor2345 at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> > On 4 Jan 2018, at 09:52, r1610091651 <r1610091651 at telenet.be> wrote:
> >
> > Hi teor
> >
> > Thanks for the reply. I'm not having issues with my relay, and I've seen
> the mail about extra users indeed. Just an observation, as I've just
> noticed few waves of these in last couple of hours. The start very abruptly
> and end just as well.
> > Not an expert, but I find it statistically significant to receive so
> many connections (499 for one /24) form a single subnet to one specific
> middle node.
> > Unless that can be explained.
>
> If they are connecting to middle nodes directly, and handling consensus
> weights badly, they could be misconfigured or experimental Tor clients.
> Or there are bugs in some Tor versions that cause small guard weights,
> even for non-guards. (Or they could be Tor2web or Single Onion Service
> clients.)
>
> A consensus weight of 1000 gets you a probability of about 0.003%.
> So if there are 1 million new clients, ignoring the Guard flag, we would
> expect 30*N of them to connect to your relay, where N is the number of
> entry nodes each client chooses.
>
> Recent clients that have stable connections have 2 active guards.
> Older clients may have 3 active guards.
> A client that fails lots of connections has a large number of active
> guards.
> (Recent clients try to limit this number. Older clients do not.)
>
> So having 17 active guards is not unreasonable.
> (It's a bug in Tor, but it's not unreasonable.)
> This would lead to you seeing ~500 connections at your relay.
>
> T
>
> --
> Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
>
> teor2345 at gmail dot com
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> xmpp: teor at torproject dot org
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>
>
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