[tor-relays] Experimental DoS mitigation is in tor master
grarpamp at gmail.com
Thu Feb 1 09:01:10 UTC 2018
> Applications that use a lot of resources will have to rate-limit themselves.
> Otherwise, relays will rate-limit them.
It's possible if relays figure that stuff by #2 might not be
an attack per se, but could be user activities... that relays
might push back on that one by...
- Seeking significantly higher default values committed
- Seeking default action committed as off
- Setting similar on their own relays if commits don't
work. And by not being default off, it should be prominently
documented if #2 affects users activities .
Indexers will distribute around it, yielding zero sum gain
for the network and nodes.
Multiparty onion p2p protocols could suffer though if #2 is
expected to affect such things.
Was it ever discovered / confirmed what tool / usage was actually
behind this recent ongoing 'DoS' phase? Whether then manifesting
itself at the IP or tor protocol level.
Sorry if I missed this in all these threads.
 There could even be a clear section with simple named
list of all options for further operator reading that could affect
users activities / protocols.
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