[tor-relays] [tor-talk] Exit in Turkey blocking torproject (komm EA93C), BadExit, Node Subscription Services, Censorship

Fri Aug 31 22:06:18 UTC 2018

Hi,

Yes I too got messages from Cynthia every few hours (wanting to meet) until
I blocked the email address.

Thanks

On Fri, 31 Aug 2018, 22:52 Matthew Glennon, <matthew at glennon.online> wrote:

> Anyone else getting nude photos and random links from Cynthia Coleman <
> cynthiacoleman843756 at ru.irzum.com> attached to this (and other thread(s)
> lately? Spam obviously, but ugh.
>
> Matthew Glennon
>
> Want to make sure only I can read your message? Use PGP!
> (Then paste the encrypted text into an email for me to receive!)
> https://keybase.io/crazysane/
> https://pgp.key-server.io/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x92E43A8A9EF85EB4
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 5:01 PM Conrad Rockenhaus <conrad at rockenhaus.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Good God every conversation, now. Anyway.
>>
>> This exit isn’t bad exit material. Turkey has been known to block Tor
>> though, I’m actually proud of this guy for having the cajones (also known
>> as balls to those of you who don’t habla espanol) to operate an exit in
>> country such as Turkey, which absolutely hates freedom inducing
>> technologies such as Tor. Let’s give this guy (or gal) the atto-boy by
>> marking the exit as a bad-exit just because stuff gets blocked in
>> autocratic regimes that this operator has no control over. None, absolutely
>> none. They screw with the DNS servers over there, that’s why during the
>> last uprising they were tagging “8.8.8.8” on the walls.
>>
>> Now they’re doing things a little more sophisticated. Either way, this
>> guy gives us a window to see what is blocked and what isn’t blocked within
>> the Turkish thunderdome.
>>
>> -Conrad
>>
>> > On Aug 30, 2018, at 9:24 PM, Nathaniel Suchy <me at lunorian.is> wrote:
>> >
>> > What if a Tor Bridge blocked connections to the tor network to selective
>> > client IPs? Would we keep it in BridgeDB because its sometimes useful?
>> >
>> > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 10:02 PM arisbe <arisbe at cni.net> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Children should be seen and not herd.  The opposite goes for Tor
>> relays.
>> >> Arisbe
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 8/30/2018 2:11 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
>> >>
>> >> So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in
>> >> Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an exit node in China or
>> Syria or
>> >> Iraq? They censor, should exits there be allowed? I don't think they
>> >> should. Make them relay only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir
>> flags
>> >> too) situation A could happen. The odds might not be in your favor.
>> Don't
>> >> risk that!
>> >>
>> >> Cordially,
>> >> Nathaniel Suchy
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 3:25 PM grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> This particular case receiving mentions for at least a few months...
>> >>> D1E99DE1E29E05D79F0EF9E083D18229867EA93C kommissarov 185.125.33.114
>> >>>
>> >>> The relay won't [likely] be badexited because neither it nor its
>> upstream
>> >>> is
>> >>> shown to be doing anything malicious. Simple censorship isn't enough.
>> >>> And except for such limited censorship, the nodes are otherwise fully
>> >>> useful, and provide a valuable presence inside such regions /
>> networks.
>> >>>
>> >>> Users, in such censoring regimes, that have sucessfully connected
>> >>> to tor, already have free choice of whatever exits they wish,
>> therefore
>> >>> such censorship is moot for them.
>> >>>
>> >>> For everyone else, and them, workarounds exist such as,,,
>> >>> https://onion.torproject.org/
>> >>> http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/
>> >>> search engines, sigs, vpns, mirrors, etc
>> >>>
>> >>> Further, whatever gets added to static exitpolicy's might move out
>> >>> from underneath them or the censor, the censor may quit, or the exit
>> >>> may fail to maintain the exitpolicy's. None of which are true
>> >>> representation
>> >>> of the net, and are effectively censorship as result of operator
>> action
>> >>> even though unintentional / delayed.
>> >>>
>> >>> Currently many regimes do limited censorship like this,
>> >>> so you'd lose all those exits too for no good reason, see...
>> >>> https://ooni.torproject.org/
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_and_surveillance_by_country
>> >>>
>> >>> And arbitrarily hamper spirits, tactics, and success of volunteer
>> >>> resistance communities and operators in, and fighting, such regimes
>> >>> around the world.
>> >>>
>> >>> And if the net goes chaotic, majority of exits will have limited
>> >>> visibility,
>> >>> for which exitpolicy / badexit are hardly manageable solutions either,
>> >>> and would end up footshooting out many partly useful yet needed
>> >>> exits as well.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> If this situation bothers users, they can use... SIGNAL NEWNYM,
>> >>> New Identity, or ExcludeExitNodes.
>> >>>
>> >>> They can also create, maintain and publish lists of whatever such
>> >>> classes of nodes they wish to determine, including various levels
>> >>> of trust, contactability, verification, ouija, etc... such that others
>> >>> can subscribe to them and Exclude at will.
>> >>> They can further publish patches to make tor automatically
>> >>> read such lists, including some modes that might narrowly exclude
>> >>> and route stream requests around just those lists of censored
>> >>> destination:exit pairings.
>> >>>
>> >>> Ref also...
>> >>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197328%20flag:exit
>> >>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:tr%20flag:exit
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> In the subect situations, you'd want to show that it is in fact
>> >>> the exit itself, not its upstream, that is doing the censorship.
>> >>>
>> >>> Or that if fault can't be determined to the upstream or exit, what
>> >>> would be the plausible malicious benefit for an exit / upstream
>> >>> to block a given destination such that a badexit is warranted...
>> >>>
>> >>> a) Frustrate and divert off 0.001% of Turk users smart enough to
>> >>> use tor, chancing through tor client random exit selection of your
>> >>> blocking exit, off to one of the workarounds that you're equally
>> >>> unlikely to control and have ranked, through your exit vs one
>> >>> of the others tor has open?
>> >>>
>> >>> b) Prop up weird or otherwise secretly bad nodes on the net,
>> >>> like the hundreds of other ones out there, for which no badexit
>> >>> or diverse subscription services yet exist to qualify them?
>> >>>
>> >>> c) ???
>> >>>
>> >>> Or that some large number of topsites were censored via
>> >>> singular or small numbers of exits / upstreams so as to be
>> >>> exceedingly annoying to the network users as a whole, where
>> >>> no other environment of such / chaotic widespread annoyance
>> >>> is known to exist at the same time.
>> >>> _______________________________________________
>> >>> tor-relays mailing list
>> >>> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
>> >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> One person's moral compass is another person's face in the dirt.
>> >>
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