[tor-relays] [tor-talk] Exit in Turkey blocking torproject (komm EA93C), BadExit, Node Subscription Services, Censorship

Fri Aug 31 21:51:22 UTC 2018

Anyone else getting nude photos and random links from Cynthia Coleman <
cynthiacoleman843756 at ru.irzum.com> attached to this (and other thread(s)
lately? Spam obviously, but ugh.

Matthew Glennon

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On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 5:01 PM Conrad Rockenhaus <conrad at rockenhaus.com>
wrote:

> Good God every conversation, now. Anyway.
>
> This exit isn’t bad exit material. Turkey has been known to block Tor
> though, I’m actually proud of this guy for having the cajones (also known
> as balls to those of you who don’t habla espanol) to operate an exit in
> country such as Turkey, which absolutely hates freedom inducing
> technologies such as Tor. Let’s give this guy (or gal) the atto-boy by
> marking the exit as a bad-exit just because stuff gets blocked in
> autocratic regimes that this operator has no control over. None, absolutely
> none. They screw with the DNS servers over there, that’s why during the
> last uprising they were tagging “8.8.8.8” on the walls.
>
> Now they’re doing things a little more sophisticated. Either way, this guy
> gives us a window to see what is blocked and what isn’t blocked within the
> Turkish thunderdome.
>
> -Conrad
>
> > On Aug 30, 2018, at 9:24 PM, Nathaniel Suchy <me at lunorian.is> wrote:
> >
> > What if a Tor Bridge blocked connections to the tor network to selective
> > client IPs? Would we keep it in BridgeDB because its sometimes useful?
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 10:02 PM arisbe <arisbe at cni.net> wrote:
> >
> >> Children should be seen and not herd.  The opposite goes for Tor relays.
> >> Arisbe
> >>
> >>
> >> On 8/30/2018 2:11 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> >>
> >> So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in
> >> Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an exit node in China or
> Syria or
> >> Iraq? They censor, should exits there be allowed? I don't think they
> >> should. Make them relay only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir
> flags
> >> too) situation A could happen. The odds might not be in your favor.
> Don't
> >> risk that!
> >>
> >> Cordially,
> >> Nathaniel Suchy
> >>
> >> On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 3:25 PM grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>> This particular case receiving mentions for at least a few months...
> >>> D1E99DE1E29E05D79F0EF9E083D18229867EA93C kommissarov 185.125.33.114
> >>>
> >>> The relay won't [likely] be badexited because neither it nor its
> upstream
> >>> is
> >>> shown to be doing anything malicious. Simple censorship isn't enough.
> >>> And except for such limited censorship, the nodes are otherwise fully
> >>> useful, and provide a valuable presence inside such regions / networks.
> >>>
> >>> Users, in such censoring regimes, that have sucessfully connected
> >>> to tor, already have free choice of whatever exits they wish, therefore
> >>> such censorship is moot for them.
> >>>
> >>> For everyone else, and them, workarounds exist such as,,,
> >>> https://onion.torproject.org/
> >>> http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/
> >>> search engines, sigs, vpns, mirrors, etc
> >>>
> >>> Further, whatever gets added to static exitpolicy's might move out
> >>> from underneath them or the censor, the censor may quit, or the exit
> >>> may fail to maintain the exitpolicy's. None of which are true
> >>> representation
> >>> of the net, and are effectively censorship as result of operator action
> >>> even though unintentional / delayed.
> >>>
> >>> Currently many regimes do limited censorship like this,
> >>> so you'd lose all those exits too for no good reason, see...
> >>> https://ooni.torproject.org/
> >>>
> >>>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_and_surveillance_by_country
> >>>
> >>> And arbitrarily hamper spirits, tactics, and success of volunteer
> >>> resistance communities and operators in, and fighting, such regimes
> >>> around the world.
> >>>
> >>> And if the net goes chaotic, majority of exits will have limited
> >>> visibility,
> >>> for which exitpolicy / badexit are hardly manageable solutions either,
> >>> and would end up footshooting out many partly useful yet needed
> >>> exits as well.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> If this situation bothers users, they can use... SIGNAL NEWNYM,
> >>> New Identity, or ExcludeExitNodes.
> >>>
> >>> They can also create, maintain and publish lists of whatever such
> >>> classes of nodes they wish to determine, including various levels
> >>> of trust, contactability, verification, ouija, etc... such that others
> >>> can subscribe to them and Exclude at will.
> >>> They can further publish patches to make tor automatically
> >>> read such lists, including some modes that might narrowly exclude
> >>> and route stream requests around just those lists of censored
> >>> destination:exit pairings.
> >>>
> >>> Ref also...
> >>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197328%20flag:exit
> >>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:tr%20flag:exit
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> In the subect situations, you'd want to show that it is in fact
> >>> the exit itself, not its upstream, that is doing the censorship.
> >>>
> >>> Or that if fault can't be determined to the upstream or exit, what
> >>> would be the plausible malicious benefit for an exit / upstream
> >>> to block a given destination such that a badexit is warranted...
> >>>
> >>> a) Frustrate and divert off 0.001% of Turk users smart enough to
> >>> use tor, chancing through tor client random exit selection of your
> >>> blocking exit, off to one of the workarounds that you're equally
> >>> unlikely to control and have ranked, through your exit vs one
> >>> of the others tor has open?
> >>>
> >>> b) Prop up weird or otherwise secretly bad nodes on the net,
> >>> like the hundreds of other ones out there, for which no badexit
> >>> or diverse subscription services yet exist to qualify them?
> >>>
> >>> c) ???
> >>>
> >>> Or that some large number of topsites were censored via
> >>> singular or small numbers of exits / upstreams so as to be
> >>> exceedingly annoying to the network users as a whole, where
> >>> no other environment of such / chaotic widespread annoyance
> >>> is known to exist at the same time.
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> tor-relays mailing list
> >>> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> >>>
> >>
> >>
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> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> One person's moral compass is another person's face in the dirt.
> >>
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> >>
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