[tor-relays] Lets increase Routing Security for Tor related BGP Prefixes

[nusenu]

Paul Templeton:
>> If you are an OVH SAS or Digital Ocean customer (directly or
>> indirectly just on the same AS) it would be great if you could ask
>> your customer support when they are planing to deploy RPKI ROAs
>> (like other big hosters already did).
> 
> Do you have a template email that can be sent? I will lodge a
> helpdesk ticket here in AU for my service (OVH) 

thanks for asking them.

OVH customers could send something like:

"
Since other big hosting companies like online.net and hetzner.com already deployed
technologies (RPKI ROAs [1]) that help reduce the risk of BGP hijacking I looked into your BGP prefixes
that contain my server and noticed that you do not make use of these security mechanisms to protect the traffic of my server(s). 

Is there a specific reason why ou did not create RPKI ROAs for your BGP prefixes yet? 
Can you share your timeline for when you are planing to create ROAs to help protect my servers' traffic
from being hijacked?

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resource_Public_Key_Infrastructure
"


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