[tor-relays] Dropping packets with TCP MSS=1400 to foil GFW active probing

[Nathaniel Suchy]

Interesting. Is there any reason to not use an obfuscated bridge?
On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 2:16 PM David Fifield <david at bamsoftware.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Aug 19, 2018 at 07:41:26PM -0400, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> > Is China successfully probing OBFS4 bridges? Or does this apply more to
> non
> > obfs bridges?
>
> China doesn't dynamically probe obfs4 bridges. (More precisely: they may
> try to probe, but the probes don't result in blocks for obfs4.) They
> only block obfs4 bridges whose addresses they learn in other ways. The
> MSS=1400 trick works, the authors report, even for non-obfuscated
> bridges.
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