[tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

[Jonathan D. Proulx]

On Sat, Sep 23, 2017 at 02:36:00PM +0000, Duncan wrote:
:Hi Jonathan,
:
:Jonathan Proulx:
:> 
:> To the initial question for a honest operator who's open about their
:> ownership and enters proper family membership data I can't see how
:> more exit volume is a problem.  TOR needs to be resilient against
:> malicious operators who don't disclose, nto sure what the current
:> value of "global" is but I should hope it's well above 5%...
:> 
:
:Firstly, it's Tor not "TOR"! :)

Tru but I type bad. :)

:I'm curious about what you mean by "global" here, and how it relates to
:[potentially] malicious operators (suspicious relays of which are
:frequently thrown off the Tor network).

"global" as in a global passive adversary, though I suppose running
nodes is an active adversary.

main point, for well behaved servers that are labled and abviously
part of the same administrative domain clients won't use two of them
for any circuit, so where's the harm? Not rehtorical there it woudl be
at soem fraction of the network (as I say hopefully well abouve 5%),
if there is have could someone smarter than me say where it is?

-Jon