[tor-relays] abuse email for non-exit relay (masergy)

[teor]

> On 23 Sep 2017, at 01:49, Iain R. Learmonth <irl at torproject.org> wrote:
> 
> Hi teor,
> 
> On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 11:14:07PM +1000, teor wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Sep 2017, at 23:03, relay 000 <relay0 at mailbox.org> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Someone is using the hidden service rendezvous protocol to ask non-exit
>>>> relays to scan non-tor IP addresses.
>>> 
>>> wow, people can misuse my *non*-exit relay to scan (aka send a TCP SYN
>>> packet) other systems on the internet?
>> 
>> Yes.
> 
> Can you clarify here that no feedback is given and that this is not a useful
> scan?
> 
> I assume the remote relay will return the same error whether there is
> something listening on the port or not, as it wasn't possible to extend the
> circuit.

Yes.

It's really much more reliable to use a Tor Exit for things like this.
They're faster, and they give more detailed error messages in response.

T

--
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B
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xmpp: teor at torproject dot org
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