[tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

Dylan Issa dylan at fdylan.co.uk
Fri Sep 22 19:29:00 UTC 2017


Definitely be careful, though, especially if they’re from the same hosting provider account. It will increase the chance of receiving an abuse report: and if someone is using Tor to attack and your exits are all picked then that chance just unfortunately increased. It would be a shame to get your nodes instant terminated in that event. 
Be careful ;) 

> On Sep 22, 2017, at 2:55 PM, John Ricketts <john at quintex.com> wrote:
> 
> Thanks Tim, this is the general idea of “If you build it they will come.”  
> 
> I simply don’t want to be a risk.
> 
> John
> 
> On Sep 22, 2017, at 08:19, teor <teor2345 at gmail.com <mailto:teor2345 at gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
>> 
>>> On 22 Sep 2017, at 23:04, John Ricketts <john at quintex.com <mailto:john at quintex.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> All,
>>> 
>>> I have brought this question  up in meetings in Seattle and other places so some of you may have already heard me ask this question.  So, at risk of repeating the question for some... here goes.
>>> 
>>> I am about to fire up more Exit Relays  and if I do so I will jump from my roughly 3% of Exit Probability to what technically could easily reach 6-8%.
>>> 
>>> I would like to know everyone’s opinion on having an individual operator have that much exit share.  In my case, all the traffic would be coming from the same AS as well, but distributed over four different cities with different upstream carriers.
>>> 
>>> Please chime in, if I get the a green light from the discussion it will happen within a month.
>> 
>> Thank you for supporting Tor!
>> And thank you for asking in advance.
>> 
>> More exit relays are good, and we should encourage people who want to
>> help the network.
>> 
>> This is a reminder that we need more exit operators, running more large
>> exits. If we think your exit share is a problem, the best way to make
>> that problem go away is to add other exits.
>> 
>> We're also working on better geographic diversity in bandwidth
>> authorities, and this may cause relay weights to shift a bit. So that's
>> another way we could end up resolving this issue :-)
>> 
>> T
>> 
>> --
>> Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
>> 
>> teor2345 at gmail dot com
>> PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B
>> ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n
>> xmpp: teor at torproject dot org
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> 
>> 
>> 
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