[tor-relays] Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)

[Nagaev Boris]

On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 10:37 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:
>> remember that they took the relay because
>> a *victim* contacted it, not because they think the "guyz behind the
>> software" did.
>
> Civil sue them for stupid thinking / false arrest confiscation,
> loss of service and use, public tarnishment, bad training, etc.
>
>>> what can be interesting for police by unpluging those
>>> guards relays ?
>
> Nothing. Well, off topic, unless they were researching confirmation
> or partitioning attacks.
>
>> Typically that's why cops choose not to bother Tor relays -- because
>> they know there will be nothing useful.
>> That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk
>> encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to
>> realize that there's nothing useful to them.
>
> This falling over may perhaps not be preferred by operators who like to
> create wins in the crypto war. You want police to go get their warrants,
> waste their time and money, just to prove nothing upon decrypt...
> then you have higher recorded, thus marketable, percent of nothing
> found among all forced decrypt cases. Instead of closer to 100%
> of such cases just confirming already forgone criminal cases.
> Having higher barriers and costs and demonstrably less fruit
> ratio can make such seizures more unlikely in first place.

Can they force an operator to decrypt, if he lives in other country
which is non-US and non-EU (e.g. Russia or China)? Does it make sense
to run nodes in countries you don't live in or visit?

What happens if an operator themselves is anonymous?


-- 
Best regards,
Boris Nagaev