[tor-relays] Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)

[Roger Dingledine]

On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 09:12:39AM +0200, Petrusko wrote:
> What will they find ?
> A Debian who ask a password to unlock the system, or it will stop booting ?
> Yeah, if police can read the system entirely, it looks like impossible
> to find something about the guyz behind the wannacry software ?

Correct. Not only that, but remember that they took the relay because
a *victim* contacted it, not because they think the "guyz behind the
software" did.

> Tor is not logging anything else than informations about uptimes/nb
> connections... what can be interesting for police by unpluging those
> guards relays ?

Typically that's why cops choose not to bother Tor relays -- because
they know there will be nothing useful. But every so often there's a
new cop that doesn't understand the Internet and just wants to collect
all the computers at the IP addresses on his list. Hard to teach them all.

> @aeris, do they ask you to uncrypt the volume ? (good luck to you...)
> What can be the best ? Uncrypt the relay to help police when asking,
> when this relay is only a relay and storing nothing else ?

That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk
encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to
realize that there's nothing useful to them. See also point two of
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/trip-report-tor-trainings-dutch-and-belgian-police

--Roger