[tor-relays] [SOLVED] published descriptor missing from consensus

[teor]

> On 9 Jun 2017, at 16:05, Scott Bennett <bennett at sdf.org> wrote:
> 
>> My relays have multiple IP addresses on a single WAN interface. They all use
>> OutboundBindAddress to separate OR and Dir traffic from outbound traffic. And
>> they make up about 1% of Tor guard/middle bandwidth.
> 
>     So, although the traffic is not separated on that machine, you use the
> source addresses to allow a router to separate the traffic as it leaves your
> network?  Or is it indeed separated on that machine via routing table entries?

The traffic goes out the same interface.
I don't know or control what happens to it after that.

>> ...

>>> Also, clients don't give up after something like that, but
>>> rather continue to try more circuits, so the end user may experience a short
>>> delay, but won't actually go unserved in such cases.
>> 
>> What actually happens depends on a number of factors:
>> * whether the other relay has successfully connected to your relay,
>> * whether both relays think the connection is canonical,
>> * whether either relay has a large exponential backoff on retries.

* how many alternate destinations are available to clients

For example, if your relay is an introduction point for a hidden service
with very few introduction points (there is a known bug that causes this),
clients may not be able to reach the service, because they will give up
after the first try.

>> So in some cases, clients will be unable to connect to your exit via some

s/exit/guard or middle/

>     Although I allow exits to a small list of places, my relay does not
> allow general exiting in a manner that would qualify it for an Exit flag
> on its entry in the consensus, so in that sense, there is no exit here.

>> middle relays.

s/middle/middle or guard/

>> This reduces your exit traffic,

s/exit/guard and middle/

>> and also reduces the number of
>> different circuit paths available to clients. (Using a wide variety of paths
>> is one of the building blocks of Tor's anonymity.)
> 
>     My daily exit traffic is ordinarily zero.  Non-zero days are so rare as
> not to be worth calculating their frequency.  I no longer remember the last
> time I saw one, but many versions of tor have come and gone since then.

T

--
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
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