[tor-relays] How can we trust the guards?

[teor]

> On 3 Jan 2017, at 17:38, Rana <ranaventures at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> @teor
>> I think you are talking about a different network, which is not Tor as
> currently designed, implemented, and deployed.
>> In particular, how do you get decent throughput, reliability, and low-
> latency out of tens of thousands of devices?
>> This is an open research problem, which the Tor design does not solve.
> 
> Sorry for being thick-headed but
> 
> 1. I do not see the connection between the latency and the number of relays.
> However many relays there are in the pool, there always will be  3 relays
> (or so)  per circuit.

Many small relays will have higher average latency.
They are further apart, and their interconnections are poorer.

Bandwidth also affects latency:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandwidth-delay_product

The network overheads are also greater, which reduces capacity and
latency. (More relays means more connections and larger directory
documents.)

> 2. I also do not see the problem with throughput and latency. If the relay
> is small, it should be used in accordance with its capacity, which is
> reported in consensus. Many small relays should increase the probability of
> finding one that has spare bandwidth (my residential relay is, for example,
> idle 93% of the time despite having decent ultra-stable 153 KB/s bandwidth
> and static IP);

Perhaps it can't handle as much tor traffic as you think.

In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, I believe the 5
tor bandwidth authorities are measuring reliably, and your relay is not
able to reliably sustain much tor traffic.

> 3. I do not see the problem of reliability. Reliability is easily measured
> and reported. The same relay is VERY reliable - totally stable for weeks,
> yet still under-used only because it is small.

Perhaps your relay is not as reliable as you think.

> 4. I do not see why the current design of Tor prevents using more relays. I
> do not believe the current design is limited by design in the number of
> relays it can support.

This was answered in the thread: more relays means more directory
overhead.

T

--
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
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