[tor-relays] How can we trust the guards?

teor teor2345 at gmail.com
Tue Jan 3 01:08:33 UTC 2017


> On 3 Jan 2017, at 11:46, Mirimir <mirimir at riseup.net> wrote:
> 
>> I believe that what is needed is changing Tor to accommodate a
>> lot of small relays running by a very large number of volunteers,
>> and to push real traffic through them.
> 
> Alternately, you need lots of small relays, running (with plausible
> deniability) on IoT devices. Mirai-style. Using covert channels (packet
> timing etc). Tor Project would never do that, I know. But eventually, it
> might come down to that.

I think you are talking about a different network, which is not Tor as
currently designed, implemented, and deployed.

In particular, how do you get decent throughput, reliability, and low-
latency out of tens of thousands of devices?
This is an open research problem, which the Tor design does not solve.

T

--
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
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