[tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 68, Issue 6

Sat Sep 3 12:08:15 UTC 2016

This is just plain FUD, what you're doing now.

The 3 letter agencies have known about tor, and have been complaining
that they can't break it, for a long time now. In fact (iirc), they even
supported its development at some point, because they use it themselves.
The fact that they're using it is no reason for concern, rather the
opposite, since that means, they trust its security enough, that they
think other states can't break it.

That this guy is an ex-cia, also isn't a problem in and of itself. It's
just like hiring an ex-criminal for your security company. He could fuck
you over big time, or he could be a great asset due to insider
knowledge. Snowden is also ex-cia, ffs.

Also, what should he have "put in place"? A backdoor in the sourcecode?
It's open source, so we can see what he added. Compromised the DirAuths?
They're run by people not directly associated with the board, who
(hopefully) wouldn't simply give out their private keys. Installed
wiretapping? He doesn't need to be member of the board to do that.

So maybe you should heed your own advice and think!

(sorry for the rant, guys...)

Am 03.09.2016 um 12:34 schrieb daniel boone:
> This is upsetting on what  I hear and see not. I worked my ass off to
> get my relay, now i hear of a strike  and tor hireing a ex-cia
> offical. Even though i read the resigned, that still does not make the
> difference does it. They have already got in and probably long enough
> to put in place what the corrupt US Govt  wants to do. They have even
> admitted they know about tor, some military usess it, but they cant
> penetrate it. Maybe we should all think
>  
> *Sent:* Friday, September 02, 2016 at 7:56 PM
> *From:* tor-relays-request at lists.torproject.org
> *To:* tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> *Subject:* tor-relays Digest, Vol 68, Issue 6
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> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: #torstrike (D.S. Ljungmark)
> 2. Re: #torstrike (Volker Mink)
> 3. Guard vs Exit Bandwidth (Tristan)
> 4. Re: Guard vs Exit Bandwidth (Green Dream)
> 5. Re: Guard vs Exit Bandwidth (Tristan)
> 6. Re: total relay bandwidth (grarpamp)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 17:26:35 +0200
> From: "D.S. Ljungmark" <spider at takeit.se>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
> Message-ID: <e91d9a79-b03e-01b6-28b9-2efcb5ebba58 at takeit.se>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> I just multiplied my BandwidthRate with a bit for my exit.
>
> //Spid
>
>
> On 02/09/16 02:28, Tristan wrote:
> > Is the Tor strike today? Because I just set up a second instance on my
> > relay to get the most out of its bandwidth.
> >
> > Oops 😏
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> >
>
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> Message: 2
> Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 17:33:54 +0200
> From: Volker Mink <volker.mink at gmx.de>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
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>
> Good job, thank you!
>
> > Am 02.09.2016 um 17:26 schrieb D.S. Ljungmark <spider at takeit.se>:
> >
> > I just multiplied my BandwidthRate with a bit for my exit.
> >
> > //Spid
> >
> >
> >> On 02/09/16 02:28, Tristan wrote:
> >> Is the Tor strike today? Because I just set up a second instance on my
> >> relay to get the most out of its bandwidth.
> >>
> >> Oops 😏
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> tor-relays mailing list
> >> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 12:24:22 -0500
> From: Tristan <supersluether at gmail.com>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: [tor-relays] Guard vs Exit Bandwidth
> Message-ID:
> <CAKkV4FEWg6u1EmU-vit_9UbBxd5FS3HufD1g8ovy4iUgz-Wnuw at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Looking at the advertised bandwidth vs bandwidth history from Tor
> Metrics[1], it appears that guard relays see much more traffic than exit
> relays. I think it might be partially because guard-only, guard-middle and
> guard-exits aren't separated, but would it really skew the numbers that
> much?
>
> [1]http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/bandwidth-flags.html
>
> --
> Finding information, passing it along. ～SuperSluether
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> Message: 4
> Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 10:51:08 -0700
> From: Green Dream <greendream848 at gmail.com>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Guard vs Exit Bandwidth
> Message-ID:
> <CAAd2PDJM+noPH+E4EwzhH_UOTKdva1DduaOe7v=hbKxm05LETw at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>
> Don't forget that some traffic enters through guards but lands on
> hidden services, skipping Exits.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 12:53:40 -0500
> From: Tristan <supersluether at gmail.com>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Guard vs Exit Bandwidth
> Message-ID:
> <CAKkV4FGhqFP-vuePwmq0+6sdiqvxFFdUQhQeUb8TuUSedOXkSQ at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> But hidden service traffic makes up about 0.01% of Tor traffic.
>
> Total is about 75Gb/s: http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/bandwidth.html
>
> Hidden services are about 900Mb/s:
> http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html
>
> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Green Dream <greendream848 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Don't forget that some traffic enters through guards but lands on
> > hidden services, skipping Exits.
> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Finding information, passing it along. ～SuperSluether
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> ------------------------------
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> Message: 6
> Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 15:55:49 -0400
> From: grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com>
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] total relay bandwidth
> Message-ID:
> <CAD2Ti28WQqFCBTKS8UTiGO0fbHH=u+ek5g57V+_xYunhNyVvMw at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>
> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 7:30 AM, Michael Armbruster <tor at armbrust.me>
> wrote:
> > On 2016-09-02 at 13:18, jensm1 wrote:
> >> which shows that the advertised relay bandwidth in the whole network is
> >> more than double the actually used bandwidth. While it's certainly nice
> >> to have a bit of breathing space to absorb load spikes, I'm wondering,
>
> > it's always good to have even more relays or exit nodes, as more "hop
> > points" for connections means more diversity throughout the network
>
> Once a net reaches adequate bandwidth capacity, adding more
> nodes can do a few things among others...
> Good:
> - Gives operators deployment experience till their bw is needed, at $cost.
> - More non-evil relays gives better odds of building a non-evil path,
> but tor
> weight's things so not exactly.
> - May add some capacity for directory operations etc
> Bad:
> - Yields rather unused nodes making it easier for passive
> observer to see you tack up and use a path through them,
> especially if you're crafting paths.
>
> One key here is probably that we don't have a good idea as to the
> quantity of evil nodes, or the hard interest and real capabilities of
> PA's.
>
> To make the call you'd need that, and perf metrics of your net under
> different ratios of advertised:consumed:nodecount, and min/avg/max/stddev
> of idle/random/full paths, to find any sweet spots / ranges.
>
> Also considerations of impact adding nodes of less bandwidth or
> more latency than average, versus a campaign to fund replace them.
>
> At 42% util by one metric, it may be money and time better spent
> elsewhere, even on better qualifying the default 'more nodes good' idea.
>
>
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