[tor-relays] New tor relay not showing up on Atlas

Thu Sep 1 02:33:06 UTC 2016

> On 1 Sep 2016, at 12:07, Marina Brown <catskillmarina at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi All:
> 
> I've set up a new relay and it is not showing up on Atlas. This is the
> Log output.
> 
> Sep 01 03:52:27.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
> Sep 01 03:52:27.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit.
> Looks like client functionality is wor
> king.
> Sep 01 03:52:27.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
> Sep 01 03:52:27.000 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort
> 78.47.167.67:9001 is reachable... (this may take
> up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating success)
> Sep 01 03:52:27.000 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is
> reachable from the outside. Excellent.
> Publishing server descriptor.
> Sep 01 03:53:28.000 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test…done.

It looks like you might have set up your relay in the last hour.

Your relay did make it into the consensus for this hour (large page):
https://consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health-2016-09-01-01-00.html#27376BCE3867E999330C53981FA0A226870F042F

It just takes Atlas a little while to update.

Here's what the process looks like:
The Tor authorities vote every hour at 50-55 minutes past the hour.
Then they produce a consensus on the hour.
Then Onionoo updates.
Then Atlas uses Onionoo for the relay data.

Wait half an hour, and check Atlas again.

Tim

> 
> 
> ## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
> ## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
> ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
> ##
> ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
> ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
> ## by removing the "#" symbol.
> ##
> ## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
> ## for more options you can use in this file.
> ##
> ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
> ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
> 
> ## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
> ## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
> ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
> #SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
> #SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
> 
> ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
> ## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
> ## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
> ## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
> ## you make.
> #SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
> #SocksPolicy reject *
> ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
> ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
> ## you want.
> ##
> ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
> ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
> ##
> ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
> #Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
> ## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
> #Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
> ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
> #Log notice syslog
> ## To send all messages to stderr:
> #Log debug stderr
> 
> ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
> ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
> ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
> #RunAsDaemon 1
> 
> ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
> ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
> #DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
> 
> ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
> ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
> #ControlPort 9051
> ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
> ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
> #HashedControlPassword
> 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
> #CookieAuthentication 1
> 
> ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
> 
> ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
> ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
> ## to tell people.
> ##
> ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
> ## address y:z.
> 
> #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
> #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
> 
> #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
> #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
> #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
> 
> # XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/XXXXXXXXX/
> HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
> 
> ################ This section is just for relays #####################
> #
> ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
> 
> ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
> ORPort 9001
> ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
> ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
> ## follows.  You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
> ## yourself to make this work.
> #ORPort 443 NoListen
> #ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
> 
> ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
> ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
> #Address noname.example.com
> 
> ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
> ## outgoing traffic to use.
> # OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
> 
> ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
> Nickname greedygertie
> 
> ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
> ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
> ## be at least 20 KB.
> ## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
> ## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
> RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB  # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
> RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
> 
> ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
> ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
> ## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
> ## hibernating.
> ##
> ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
> #AccountingMax 4 GB
> ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
> #AccountingStart day 00:00
> ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
> ## is per month)
> #AccountingStart month 3 15:00
> 
> ## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
> ## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
> ## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
> ## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
> ## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
> ## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
> #ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
> ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
> #ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
> ContactInfo 0x4D9C031B Marina Brown <catskillmarina at gmail.com>
> 
> ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
> ## if you have enough bandwidth.
> #DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
> ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
> ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
> ## follows.  below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
> ## forwarding yourself to make this work.
> #DirPort 80 NoListen
> #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
> ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
> ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
> ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
> ## distribution for a sample.
> #DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
> 
> ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
> ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
> ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
> ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
> ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
> ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it
> would
> ## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
> #MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
> 
> ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
> ## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
> ## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
> ## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
> ## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
> ## described in the man page or at
> ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
> ##
> ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
> ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
> ##
> ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
> ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
> ## users will be told that those destinations are down.
> ##
> ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
> ## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
> ## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
> ##
> #ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
> #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
> ExitPolicy reject *:*
> 
> ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
> ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
> ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
> ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
> ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
> ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
> #BridgeRelay 1
> ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
> ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
> ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
> ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
> #PublishServerDescriptor 0
> 
> # more fingerprint
> greedygertie 27376BCE3867E999330C53981FA0A226870F042F
> 
> greedygertie is not showing up on atlas
> 
> 
> --- Marina
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
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> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B
ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n
xmpp: teor at torproject dot org

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