[tor-relays] Intrusion Prevention System Software - Snort or Suricata

[Alecks Gates]

Is the distinction between knowledge after the fact and knowledge at
the time of occurence of "bad traffic" not important?

I'm all for reducing bad traffic, but where does the line get drawn?

I've also been dealing with multiple abuse reports on Digital Ocean.
Quite a few common abuse ports are already disallowed (in fact I have
only a small white list); most of the problems originate from port 80.
 And of course there's nothing we can do for encrypted web traffic
anyway.

For what it's worth, I'm glad this thread came up and I've notified
Digital Ocean of it in one of my support tickets.

It's really not up to lowly little me to decide whos traffic gets to
pass.

Alecks Gates

On Tue, 2016-10-04 at 23:55 +0200, oconor at email.cz wrote:
> > > > If I understand that well ... if tor operator is avare, that his tor
node is used for illegal activity (when their ISP told them about
that) and he's not going to do anything abou that, he wont be guity
by complicity?
> 
> 
> > On 04.10.16 22:37, oconor at email.cz wrote:
> 
> > > Tor and IPS has both it's own nature and you shouldn't be punished,
if
> > your intension was just to filter the bad traffic.
> 
> > And who is to decide what constitutes "bad traffic"? I am not a
lawyer,
> but in Germany one of the cornerstones of not being held responsible
> > for traffic passing through a Tor node is § 8 of the
Telemediengesetz:
> > http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/__8.html -- sometimes referred
to
> colloquially as the "provider privilege".
> 
> > One only is free of responsibility if one neither initiates a
transfer,
> nor selects the transfer's destination, nor selects or modifies the
> transmitted data. That's what "passing through" means.
> 
> According to two lawyers I spoke to, exit policies might already be
> > borderline breaking these rules for exit nodes, but the technical
basis
> > at least guarantees that traffic will never reach an exit node that
does
> > not let it pass. Now think of a firewall that interferes with
transfers
> > once the data has already reached the exit node. Wouldn't you agree
that
> this means selecting/modifiying the transmitted data?
> 
> That's just one national law that I am aware of, I imagine other
> countries have similar regulations in place. Any internet service
> > provider interfering with net neutrality risks lawsuits, because it
is
> not an ISP's prerogative to decide what traffic is "good" or "bad".
> 
> -Ralph
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