[tor-relays] Intrusion Prevention System Software - Snort or Suricata

oconor at email.cz oconor at email.cz
Tue Oct 4 21:55:32 UTC 2016


If I understand that well ... if tor operator is avare, that his tor node is
used for illegal activity (when their ISP told them about that) and he's not
going to do anything abou that, he wont be guity by complicity?


"On 04.10.16 22:37, oconor at email.cz wrote:

> Tor and IPS has both it's own nature and you shouldn't be punished, if
> your intension was just to filter the bad traffic.

And who is to decide what constitutes "bad traffic"? I am not a lawyer,
but in Germany one of the cornerstones of not being held responsible
for traffic passing through a Tor node is ยง 8 of the Telemediengesetz:
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/__8.html -- sometimes referred to
colloquially as the "provider privilege".

One only is free of responsibility if one neither initiates a transfer,
nor selects the transfer's destination, nor selects or modifies the
transmitted data. That's what "passing through" means.

According to two lawyers I spoke to, exit policies might already be
borderline breaking these rules for exit nodes, but the technical basis
at least guarantees that traffic will never reach an exit node that does
not let it pass. Now think of a firewall that interferes with transfers
once the data has already reached the exit node. Wouldn't you agree that
this means selecting/modifiying the transmitted data?

That's just one national law that I am aware of, I imagine other
countries have similar regulations in place. Any internet service
provider interfering with net neutrality risks lawsuits, because it is
not an ISP's prerogative to decide what traffic is "good" or "bad".

-Ralph
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