[tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Marina Brown]

On 07/21/2016 11:23 AM, Alex Chang-Lam wrote:
> I believe also being highly known and trusted by the Tor project leads,
> likely the current dirauths, and the community as a whole.
> 
> On Jul 21, 2016, at 6:03 AM, Sanjeev Gupta <ghane0 at gmail.com
> <mailto:ghane0 at gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
>> Hi.
>>
>> What are the requirements, apart from long-term stability, for this?
>>
>>
>> On 21 Jul 2016 12:18 pm, "Sebastian Hahn" <sebastian at torproject.org
>> <mailto:sebastian at torproject.org>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>     > On 21 Jul 2016, at 05:20, Me <info at gumbyzee.torzone.net
>>     <mailto:info at gumbyzee.torzone.net>> wrote:
>>     > So what are we going to do when Green shuts down the Bridge
>>     Authority server next month? Will it have a serious effect, or
>>     will there be any apparent issues or slowdowns?
>>
>>     We'll have to act before that. We're currently looking for
>>     a new operator for the bridge authority and a suitable hosting
>>     location, which we will want to include in Tor releases asap.
>>     For a while we will feed the data from the two concurrently
>>     running bridge authorities to the bridge database for
>>     distribution to users, then when Tonga (Lucky's auth) is shut
>>     down the new one will have taken over. We will lose the data
>>     about all bridges that aren't updated after the time Tonga is
>>     shut off. This means fewer bridges for bridge db to give out and
>>     potentially a drop in counted (not necessarily actual) bridge
>>     users of Tor.
>>
>>     Cheers
>>     Sebastian
>>
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> 
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Maybe i am out of line for suggesting this but i will suggest anyway.
Might i suggest that the next bridge authority be hosted on tor inc ip
space and perhaps be 2 hosts instead of one.

It looks like this was a single point of failure. It would be easy
enough to have a volunteer bgp announce a specific ip address. If they
decided to drop out then it would not cause this type of consternation
in the future. Having more than one bridge auth has obvious benefits.

Flame me away for my ignorance. It has been years since i last poured
over the tor source code.

--- Marina Brown

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