[tor-relays] Feedback

[Random Tor Node Operator]

On 26.02.2016 13:50, Roman Mamedov wrote:
> On Fri, 26 Feb 2016 12:27:07 +0100
> Random Tor Node Operator <tor at unterderbruecke.de> wrote:
> 
>> So in terms of censorship resistance, bridges with occasionally changing
>> IP are better for the Tor network than those with static IP.
> 
> EVERY DAY != "occasionally". 
> 
> Your idea may have some reason to it, but when the IP changes daily, users
> won't learn about the bridge's new IP in time to even get any good use out of
> it (few hours at most?) before it changes again.

Yes, the time span in which the bridge will be useful is limited, but
that is no reason not to keep up the bridge.
A bridge that is useful for a couple hours each day is more useful than
a bridge which is not available at all.
Such short-lived bridge IPs are increasingly important against quickly
responding adversaries, which are fast at blacklisting bridge IPs.
In such a scenario, short-lived bridges will be the only ones that a
user can reach.


> Does not help that getting and adding bridges to the client is not an
> automated but an entirely manual process currently (as perhaps it needs to be).

That is a completely different issue.



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