[tor-relays] Exit Node Geographical Location

[Chris Adams]

Okay,

So I've found a ISP in Kenya that says they're happy to host a tor exit
node. The ping is 270ms from a Canadian ISP, 16 hops. 183ms from Germany,
13 hops.

Ultimately, am I making the tor network better or worse, if I were to set
up some tor nodes here?

- Chris

On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 8:41 AM, Sebastian Hahn <sebastian at torproject.org>
wrote:

>
> > On 09 Dec 2016, at 09:34, teor <teor2345 at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> On 8 Dec. 2016, at 22:08, Sec INT <sec.int9 at gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> US just has alot of people trying to exit there - so its always busy
> >
> > Tor clients choose exits at random, based on the ports the exit allows.
> > They *do not* try to find an exit close to the site they are going to.
> >
> >> - I find Tor follows the money mostly - high concentration in W.Europe
> and US but drops sharply anywhere else -
> >
> > All the tor bandwidth-measuring authorities are also located in either
> > Western Europe or the US. Relays closer to a bandwidth authority
> > (lower network latency) are measured faster than those further away.
> >
> > This is a side-effect of measuring the delay in transmission inside
> > the relay itself.
> >
> >> On 9 Dec. 2016, at 06:23, Duncan Guthrie <dguthrie at posteo.net> wrote:
> >>
> >> Thus, running relays in Africa and Asia should be a priority right now.
> >
> > To make this work well, we would need bandwidth authorities in Africa
> > and Asia. Otherwise, those relays won't be used much.
> >
> > (We're working on it - I hope!)
>
> Just adding bw auths in Africa won't do too much, because the relevant
> factor is who is dominating the median. If we had a majority of bwauths
> there, the european/us relays would get measured worse. Also, the more
> diversity we have, the worse the latency gets anyway - this is not to
> say that we shouldn't add more diversity, but there'll be clearly
> noticable issues.
>
> Maybe we could add something to the current system where we try to
> estimate how much path length will make a measurement worse by default,
> and compensate for that somehow. Otoh, the current state of bwauths is
> so sad that I don't know if that'd be even remotely possible. Also such
> a system must be resistant to tampering, of course.
>
> Cheers
> Sebastian
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>



-- 
Chris Adams <http://chrisada.co.uk>
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