[tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?

[Dave Warren]

Again, I think I was quite clear on that: I don't care. I'm not using
Tor to hide anything from Facebook, and I'm quite aware that any data
Facebook can touch is recorded and I assume it is or will be published.
That's not acceptable to everyone but it's fine for me in many cases.


Even here, Tor helps because when you login to Facebook via the
hidden service, and then create a New Identity and continue browsing
other sites, Facebook can no longer associate my general web surfing
with my Facebook account, so suddenly I am in control of what data I
provide to Facebook rather than Facebook collecting anything and
everything they can.


If you have a different threat model, that's fine, use Tor and the
internet appropriate to your needs.


On Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 00:22, Duncan Guthrie wrote:

> Well, apart from using Facebook...

> 

> On 8 December 2016 7:51:09 am GMT+00:00, Dave Warren
> <davew at hireahit.com> wrote:
>> I agree 100%. And yet, it's still useful for those who don't have
>> anything to fear from using Tor, but still want the privacy and
>> security from the last mile.
>> 

>> On Wed, Dec 7, 2016, at 23:45, Duncan Guthrie wrote:

>>> The problem with Facebook is that their policies on real names
>>> somewhat goes against hiding from a repressive regime. Their terms
>>> and conditions mandate that they kick people who use pseudonyms, and
>>> make fellow Facebook users rat on each other.
>>> If I was an activist I would be wary of using it on or off Tor at
>>> all. If I am going to be harassed for using Facebook, it's probably
>>> unsafe to use Tor altogether. It isn't worth the risk, except in a
>>> very limited manner.
>>> I think the hidden service in this case is just gesture politics.
>>> It's not really for citizens in repressive regimes, but people who
>>> have little to fear from using Tor.
>>> 

>>> Duncan

>>> 

>>> On 7 December 2016 3:20:05 pm GMT+00:00, Rana
>>> <ranaventures at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>>>  From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces at lists.torproject.org]
>>>>>  On Behalf Of heartsucker
>>>>>
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

>>>>>  Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 5:11 PM
>>>>> 

>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

>>>>>  : tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
>>>>> 

>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

>>>>>  Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes
>>>>>  being public?
>>>>>
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

>>>>>  
>>>>> 

>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

>>>>>  As one of the Tor users who connects to services where I have to
>>>>>  use my real name (e.g., my banks), I think it's not helpful to
>>>>>  make assumptions about everyone's use case. Part of why I use Tor
>>>>>  is to
>>>>>
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

>>>>>  keep my ISPs from snooping on what I'm doing, and it's possible
>>>>>  some of these millions of facebook users are doing the same.
>>>>>
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> We will never know the breakdown of the Facebook users by the
>>>> reason why they use Tor. However, surely many of them are under
>>>> repressive regimes and do not want their ass kicked for what they
>>>> write on Facebook. Protecting them is fine purpose and anyhow, Tor
>>>> has no control over how people use the network and certainly not
>>>> over why they use it.
>>>>
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> Rana
>>>> 

>>>> 
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>>>> 

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>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> tor-relays mailing list
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
>>>> 

>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

>>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>>>>
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 

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>> 

>> 



>> 
>> 

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