[tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?

[Peter Ludikovsky]

How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit
nodes exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that
of the middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd have to manually request
exits by email/web service/… As a result you'd be limited to a few
exits, which might not necessarily have an exit policy matching your
needs, or might be offline, or simply overloaded on account of there
being less than regular exits.

By the way, I just checked, Gmail works without problems over Tor (both
Web and IMAPS).

Regards
/peter

On 12/07/2016 12:25 PM, Rana wrote:
> I mean, why aren’t some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and
> temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying
> service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would
> increase security.
> 
> 
> 
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