[tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?

[Matthew Finkel]

On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 11:51:34AM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 01:25:59PM +0200, Rana wrote:
> > I mean, why aren't some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and
> > temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service
> > to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase
> > security.
> 
> I'll simply refer you to the FAQ:

That was rude of me, answer below. Do you disagree with the reasoning?


  *You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits.*
  There are a few reasons we don't:

    a. We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients
    need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they can
    get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the list of
    relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections through Tor
    to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.

    b. If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to do
    so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to connect
    to them, but people have the right to decide who their services should
    allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users, they can.

    c. Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive
    response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving them the
    option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they really want to
    eliminate private access to their system, and if not, what other options they
    might have. The time they might otherwise have spent blocking Tor, they may
    instead spend rethinking their overall approach to privacy and anonymity.


> 
>     https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits