[tor-relays] HoneyPot?

[AMuse]

Given the current state of the internet (ie, massive warrantless spying
by LEO's and packet inspection by ISP's) I cannot imagine how any TOR
operator would block encrypted services and not be what most reasonable
people consider a "Bad exit". 

On 2015-10-29 14:05, Mike Perry wrote: 

> Green Dream:
> 
>> Mirimir: aside from the nickname, do you have any reason to believe it was out of the ordinary? The exit policy mostly only seems to allow non-encrypted services (80 but not 443, 143
> 
> A while ago we were actively marking nodes that only allowed
> non-encrypted services as BadExit, since there were no satisfactory
> explanations given as to why nodes should need this policy.
> 
> Back then, the most common explanation people gave was "I need the
> ability to block traffic that looks evil." Unfortunately, all mechanisms
> available to do this will also end up blocking legitimate content at
> some rate. Nobody was using anything more advanced than snort-style
> regular expressions that matched things that happened to look like
> exploits.
> 
> FWIW, I am personally in favor of reinstating such a policy. I doubt the
> situation has changed.
> 
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