[tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

[nusenu]

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[split from 'Giving away some "pre-warmed" relay keys for adoption']

> I'm of the opinion that it may be worth adding code to pin relay 
> identities to IP addresses on the DirAuth side so that consensus 
> weight and flag assignment gets totally reset if the ORPort IP 
> changes, but if there's too much churn already it may cause more 
> trouble than it's worth.

I hope such code will not be added, because it renders relays on dynamic
IPs basically useless.
In the past ~week only there were >1000 fingerprints (<3% cw fraction)
using more than one IP address (in that timeframe)


> I'm somewhat torn on the whole key pinning thing, because I think
> an individual operator moving their relay around is sort of ok
> (though in an ideal world the consensus weight should get reset and
> rapidly re-measured), but giving away the private component of a
> relay's identity key is putting users at risk, and is behavior that
> should be discouraged if not outright prohibited if possible (and
> key pinning would be a heavy handed way to rule out this sort of 
> stupidity).
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