[tor-relays] unflagged BAD EXIT nodes

[starlight.2015q2 at binnacle.cx]

At 10:04 7/4/2015 +0200, nusenu wrote:
>I find it more worrying that we do not "hear"
>about the 'more serious attacks' that keep
>them busy and don't allow them to look into 
>i.e. 'AviatoChortler' (even after a few
>weeks). That might mean that there is a
>constant stream of 'more serious attacks'
>(without information I can only guess).

Here is one where 70 bad exits were
rewriting an .onion address on a
clearnet portal and sending a Tor
email service's users to an evil
onion clone:

https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-April/037549.html

I can see the argument for ignoring
the near-zero-ranked exits (as they
will virtually never be used) and
the massive BW password stealer
(due to the value of the bandwidth
and the fact that HTTPS is immune
to passive sniffing).

But am concerned Chloe apparently
received mute indifference as her
contribution to the project is
significant.