[tor-relays] Tor and Freenode

Matthew Anderson when2plus2is5 at outlook.com
Sat Jan 24 16:16:08 UTC 2015


Hi,
 
I've been running a few relays for about a week, so I'm fairly new to all of this fun stuff as well!
 
I think you've missed a few steps, and have over-reacted a bit to the new technology.
 
There are many reasons why you cannot, and should not, connect to the network from an exit relay. But I have to ask, why would you want to connect to freenode from an exit relay when you can connect from within? There's a reason they offer the hidden service to connect to their network. Attempting to bypass that seems silly. You've already accepted that you would have to use SASL using the exit relay, through your suggested option #2, so using it within is only a tiny, additional step.
 
Respectfully, I think you have a _lot_ to learn. I've spent every day, several hours per day, the past 8 days reading as much as I possibly can, and I know enough to know that I don't know enough. 
 
Also, 
 
https://freenode.net/irc_servers.shtml
...
"Connections to freenode directly from Tor exit nodes are not allowed, as it is impossible to distinguish traffic originating on that computer from Tor exit traffic. In addition to providing better protection and location privacy, the hidden service gives end-to-end encryption, providing benefits similar to using SSL (ircs/irc-ssl)..."
 
And,
 
"We encourage you to consider providing "middleman" bandwidth to the Tor network by setting up your host as a Tor relay. Specify how much bandwidth you want to provide and set your exit policy to reject *:*. It will help us make up for the bandwith we use for freenode's hidden service."
 
I do hope this helps.
 
 
> Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2015 16:46:48 +0100
> From: mah at jump-ing.de
> To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Tor and Freenode
> 
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> Am 24.01.2015 um 16:21 schrieb Lukas Erlacher:
> > Your idealism is noble, but it isn't going to work that way. IRC
> > networks aren't going to open up to Tor more than Freenode already
> > does, for the simple reasons that it makes controlling trolls and
> > spammers absolutely impossible.
> 
> Being connected anonymously doesn't mean this connection has to be without authentication. For example, it should be possible to request a NickServ login after connecting and allowing to register a nick, but before entering a room. Without a room there's not much to spam.
> 
> It should also be possible to allow connections from exit relays with SASL authentication. Not as good as the above plan, still much better than what we have now.
> 
> Nerds are the typical kind of persons predestined to run relays as early adopters and are also the typical population on Freenode. Similar for many other IRC nodes. These two _have_ to match to make Tor popular.
> 
> > You should probably run a middle relay until you've learned more
> > about this.
> 
> What else do I have to "learn"? Using Freenode and running an exit relay don't match, the technical details are secondary. At very least Freenode should be honest and state that they do not welcome anonymous connections and as such make their "welcome to Tor" pointless. I hate marketing speech obfuscating the truth.
> 
> 
> Markus
> 
> - -- 
> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
> Dipl. Ing. (FH) Markus Hitter
> http://www.jump-ing.de/
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