[tor-relays] Reminder: don't run transparent proxies at exits

eric gisse jowr.pi at gmail.com
Sat Jan 10 03:18:59 UTC 2015

This isn't exactly a convincing argument.

The HTTP specification explicitly supports caching. On a protocol
level, this is quite acceptable and standard. The method I am using is
precisely what ISP's do in scenarios where they want to maximize their

On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 8:12 PM, Drake Wilson <drake at dasyatidae.net> wrote:
> eric gisse wrote:
>> Why? People say 'DO NOT MESS WITH TRAFFIC' but in the same breath they
> Because the interface level at which exit traffic proper occurs is TCP,
> and the interface contract for the client is that the TCP stream will be
> direct to the intended destination.  The interface level at which
> Tor-traversing DNS requests occur is DNS, and the interface contract for
> the client is that the DNS request will be resolved in some way that
> reflects the consensus public DNS on the Internet.  Using a DNS cache is
> consistent with being expected to terminate DNS.  Using an HTTP cache is
> not consistent with being expected to terminate TCP.  Reblocking at the
> TCP level presumably happens, for instance, and is not considered "messing
> with traffic" because it's not specified that Tor passes arbitrary IP
> packets, only TCP (and I'm not sure it even requires _full_ TCP other than
> the bidirectional octet streams; I forget whether the urgent marker is
> passed through, for instance).
> So it's not inconsistent to hear those for exit operators WRT Tor's design.
> If you think the design is flawed, that's a separate matter.
>    ---> Drake Wilson
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