[tor-relays] [tor-assistants] Running obfs4proxy on Debian Stable

ZEROF security at netmajstor.com
Thu Feb 5 20:17:21 UTC 2015


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

If you want to try to install jessi without updating your system it's
possible. Add repositry to /etc/apt/sources.list, run apt-get update.
Then use this and only this command to upgrade only that package from
new repository (check if you need to replace jessie with unstable or
something like that):

apt-get -t jessie install name of your package

You don't need to remove repository from your sources list because
this command will lock upgrades of other packages. Check this url for
more info: https://wiki.debian.org/AptPreferences, in section
"Installing from unstable".


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: OpenPGP.js v0.7.2
Comment: http://openpgpjs.org
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=FL9d
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


On 3 February 2015 at 18:33, Alexander Dietrich <alexander at dietrich.cx>
wrote:

> Is it possible to install the obfs4proxy package securely (with signature
> verification) on Ubuntu? I looked at this a while ago, but couldn't figure
> out how to make it work.
>
> Thanks,
> Alexander
> ---
> PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
>
>
> On 2015-02-03 01:14, Yawning Angel wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 2 Feb 2015 22:41:40 +0000
>> isis <isis at torproject.org> wrote:
>>
>>> I requested that the obfs4proxy package in Debian jessie be ported to
>>> wheezy-backports, [0] however, it seems this is extremely unlikely to
>>> happen because it would mean backporting pretty much every Golang
>>> package in existence.
>>>
>>
>> Last I heard, that was mostly unnecessary, though how exactly this apt
>> pinning stuff works is a mystery to me[0].
>>
>>  I would be super stoked if we could make it as easy and seamless as
>>> possible for the Bridge operators who are still running obfs2 (!!) to
>>> move to supporting better, newer Pluggable Transports.  Currently
>>> recommended PTs to run are: obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, and
>>> fteproxy.  When Tor Browser 4.5 becomes stable (probably in mid-April
>>> 2015), we'll want lots more obfs4 Bridges!  For the super adventurous
>>> sysadmins who'd like to try Yawning's experimental new post-quantum
>>> PT, Basket [1] is one of the newest PTs.
>>>
>>
>> More obfs4 bridges would be amazing.  It's worth noting that obfs4proxy
>> can also handle obfs2 and 3 (and with a branch that I need to
>> test/merge soon, a ScrambleSuit client), and it even is easy to run
>> bridges on ports < 1024 without messing with port forwarding.
>>
>> Basket is still a research project and non-researchers shouldn't deploy
>> it because the wire format may change (and it consumes a hilarious
>> amount of bandwidth).
>>
>>  We should probably come up with some easy instructions for operators
>>> of Tor Bridge relays who are running Debian stable, such as adding an
>>> Apt pin to pull in only the obfs4proxy package and its dependencies
>>> from Debian jessie and keep everything else pinned to stable.  If
>>> someone has done this, or has another simple solution, would you mind
>>> writing up some short how-to on the steps you took, please?
>>>
>>> [0]:
>>> http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-anonymity-
>>> tools/Week-of-Mon-20150202/001119.html
>>> [1]: https://github.com/yawning/basket
>>>
>>
>> All of obfs4proxy's dependencies are build time.  The binary is
>> statically linked because that's what Go does.  David S.'s ansible-tor
>> package does it like this:
>>
>> https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor/commit/
>> f897581daa79389ddcb28c7dae601473e85e8226
>>
>> So the documentation should be a matter of "how to setup the apt pin
>> for a single package".  I've heard someone complaining about the tor
>> AppArmor profile but that also isn't something I've dealt with ever.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> --
>> Yawning Angel
>>
>> [0]: I just scp the binary to my bridge whenever I need to update it,
>> and my idea of how to update all my linux systems starts with "pacman"
>> and not "apt-get".
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> tor-relays mailing list
>> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>



-- 
http://www.backbox.org
http://www.pentester.iz.rs
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20150205/1f33c8cc/attachment.html>


More information about the tor-relays mailing list