[tor-relays] Oniontip
Mike Perry
mikeperry at torproject.org
Mon Sep 29 22:09:01 UTC 2014
Donncha O'Cearbhaill:
> Thanks everyone for all the feedback. I'm delighted to see OnionTip is
> being used and that relay operators are getting some (usually token)
> appreciation.
>
> Mike, I've taken on board all the feedback you gave to this list on 2nd
> September. I've just pushed some changes. There is now a listing of all
> previous transactions sent from OnionTip, their size and the number or
> relays they have selected to pay.[1]
>
> The number of selected relays gives a rough indication of how many
> people are just paying the default (to all the relays) or are setting
> their own criteria.
>
> I've also published a Python script to validate the transactions
> completely from the blockchain based on the seed I use to generate
> addresses [2].
>
> I'm open to all suggests for a better distribution strategy. At the
> moment I definitely think the incentive is somewhat wrong when someone
> gets a much larger share by running a middle relay in a cheap bandwidth
> location than someone running a smaller exit in a geographical diversity
> location.
>
> As most people seem to use the defaults, for a start I'm going to add an
> option so that Exits receive a premium on their bandwidth share by
> default (maybe 1.5-2x).
>
> If there are any particular questions anyone has about the data or
> donations so far, I'm happy to pull the data from the DB and try to
> answer them. For one, I'm going to try find out how many relays had
> bitcoin address listed in their first day or two. Maybe it can give an
> indication how many new relay operators are being pulled in because of
> OnionTip.
>
> Thanks again for all the feedback so far. I look forward to seeing what
> we can do to improve OnionTip, and to continue supporting the growth of
> the Tor network.
>
> Regards,
> Donncha
>
> [1] https://oniontip.com/transactions
> [2]
> https://github.com/DonnchaC/oniontip/blob/master/scripts/payment-check.py
Thank you for publishing these scripts!
I think the most important thing right now is for us to be able to
easily tell what the system is doing, and I think you have done that.
As for what the default *should* be, I think we may want to think about
that for a bit depending on what we think we want to encourage in the
network. If we get an idea as to if Exits are actually more expensive to
run than non-Exits, we can use that to guide these bonuses.
Thanks a lot for OnionTip! It's now got my vote for inclusion on the Tor
donations page!
> On Sun, 2014-09-28 at 02:32 -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> > Thomas White:
> > > Hmmm... appears to be have been upgraded since I last checked then
> > > (which was only a few weeks ago!). Nicely done oniontip. I stand
> > > corrected.
> >
> > Well, my original ask was for everyone to be able to verify that all
> > 12.36 BTC that oniontip has received (as of right now) has actually been
> > distributed how the users have asked.
> >
> > I suppose that since individual users can easily inspect that their
> > donation has gone to the relays they selected (by looking at
> > blockchain.info for their one-time use address), it is unlikely that the
> > system will get away with cheating for long. But it is still hard for a
> > new donor to tell if any other donors have been swindled recently, using
> > simple blockchain inspection. They basically have to click around on the
> > individual relay recipient keys to make sure everything looks legit.
> >
> > This makes me nervous in terms of endorsement. I can easily see hundreds
> > of users getting swindled before one of them suddenly realizes that
> > there is an extra bitcoin address in their transactions that is not in
> > the original relay list they selected, or that the actual bitcoin
> > distribution was slightly different than what they selected. If all
> > users could inspect all donations easily, this type of compromise would
> > be found quicker.
> >
> > Ideally, it would be possible to verify all of these questions (and many
> > more) with only the blockchain. For instance, a comment in the bitcoin
> > transaction could indicate the OnionTip options selected, and a single
> > page on the website could allow us to view all donations to the system.
> >
> >
> > Beyond this, I think there are actually interesting sociological
> > questions we could answer with easy access to the OnionTip donation data
> > and option selection. I'm very curious how donors are choosing to
> > distribute their Bitcoin to the relays.
> >
> > For instance:
> >
> > 1. Is OnionTip encouraging the type of network diversity we want? Do we
> > want to suggest changes to the default donation mode to encourage
> > better diversity?
> >
> > 2. UI is still confusing to me. Is this UI causing people to prefer a
> > certain type of donation over others, where they probably shouldn't?
> >
> > a. Is anyone actually using the Guard or Exit filters? If not, this
> > means my super-cheap and unreliable FDC middle node will probably
> > get me more OnionTip donations than either a more stable Guard
> > node, or a more hassle-prone Exit node. This seems like an
> > undesirable way to incentivize relay operation. Is it happening?
> > Or are most people selecting Guard+Exit?
> >
> > b. Are people taking advantage of the country selection dialog? Are
> > they doing it in a way that is favoring underrepresented countries?
> > Or are people just choosing countries based on the next World Cup
> > match, the current Olympic gold medal count leader, or some other
> > crazy notion that seems to make little sense to network diversity?
> >
> > 3. What are big donors doing? Do they always select the default choice?
> >
> > a. If so, we should think waaay harder about what this choice is.
> >
> > b. If not, what do they want? Do they like specific or strange
> > countries? Do they like countries with the fewest relays? With the
> > lowest current bandwidth? With the best laws? Do we agree with
> > their choices, and want to make it easier for other donors to make
> > them too? Or should we be concerned, and try to encourage other
> > behavior?
> >
> > c. Maybe only big donors get scammed with extra BTC destination
> > addresses or a different transaction entirely? How can I see if
> > other recent big donors have been scammed?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 28/09/2014 03:28, Ed Carter wrote:
> > > > The process is completely transparent. All Bitcoin transactions
> > > > are viewable by the public on the Bitcoin blockchain. The Bitcoin
> > > > addresses are posted by the relay operators themselves in their
> > > > contact info on their relay. I can confirm that I receive
> > > > donations made to the address I posted on my relay.
> > > >
> > > > My relay:
> > > > https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/3C49A7D9BEBC668352F627CE60B1FE9B628DD2EA
> > > >
> > > > Blockchain.info web page showing donations received to my
> > > > address:
> > > > http://blockchain.info/address/1GXZVChXoxgrBzqMsCrWGu2ua6VTKSH6U1
> > > >
> > > >> My concern (which has been highlighted before by Mike Perry) is
> > > >> that the site lacks accountability and transparency. There is no
> > > >> way to verify the donations actually reach the operators.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
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--
Mike Perry
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